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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.1
You either break the paradigm, or the paradigm will break you.2

INTRODUCTION
While the topic of same-sex marriage has generated a lively academic
debate,3 there is a lack of transnational comparative analysis of arguments
1. W.Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943).
2. A Colombian mother, Ms. Marta Lucia Cuellar, advocating before the Colombian Congress
on behalf of marriage equality, YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=kXx7BhNrIO0&feature=player_embedded.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE]; SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004); JOHN CORVINO &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012). Outside the United States, European
scholars have written extensively about the development of same-sex marriage in that region. See, e.g.,
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001); CONTEMPORARY GENDER
RELATIONS AND CHANGES IN LEGAL CULTURES (Hanne Petersen, Jose María Lorenzo Villaverde &
Ingrid Lund-Andersen eds., 2013); JENS RYDSTRÖM, ODD COUPLES: A HISTORY OF GAY MARRIAGE IN
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commonly made by courts when granting same-sex couples access to
marriage.4 Courts formulating decisions about same-sex marriage have the
unique opportunity to reevaluate the privileged legal position of marriage
in light of current constitutional or fundamental rights.5 As the number of
claims about inclusion or equal recognition of unmarried couples grows,
challenges to the rationality of marriage as a privileged institution become
more relevant. Some courts understand that it is not possible to protect
traditional notions of marriage without discussing the rationality of
marriage as the institution that defines the types of families we ought to
protect.6 Once marriage is reviewed through the lenses of equality and

SCANDINAVIA (2011). And rather recently, there is some literature on same-sex marriage in Latin
America. See, e.g., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND RESISTANCE (Jason
Pierceson, Adriana Piatti-Crocker & Shawn Schulenberg eds., 2013). In recent years there has been
more literature looking internationally to the same-sex marriage debate. See, e.g., MAN YEE KAREN
LEE, EQUALITY, DIGNITY, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A RIGHTS DISAGREEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETIES (2010); KELLY KOLLMAN, THE SAME-SEX UNIONS REVOLUTION IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC POLICY CHANGE (2013); SAME-SEX COUPLES
BEFORE NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS (Daniele Gallo, Luca
Paladini & Pietro Pustorino eds., 2014).
4. Several articles analyze decisions individually. See, e.g., Alejandro Madrazo & Estefanía
Vela, The Mexican Supreme Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1883–84 (2011);
Daniel Bonilla, Same-Sex Couples in Colombia: Three Models for Their Legal and Political
Recognition, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND RESISTANCE, supra note 3, at
111; Mauricio Albarracin Caballero & Juan Camilo Rivera Rugeles, Jurisprudencia Fuera del Closet
[Case law out of the Closet], in CICLO ROSA DIEZ AÑOS: LECTURAS SELECTAS DE UN ESPACIO PARA
LA DIVERSIDAD SEXUAL Y DE GÉNERO (José Fernando Serrano ed., forthcoming 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/113120891/Malbarracin-Jrivera-Jurisprudencia-Fuera-Del-Closet-FinalOctubre-2013-3; Adilson José Moreira, We are Family! Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions in
Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1003 (2012).
5. See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 21, 25 (2010) (“A number of decisions that are not about lesbian and gay rights have
fundamentally shaped the Court’s conception of families and love.”); Mary Anne Case, What Feminists
Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1209–14 (2010) (making a
similar argument about how the U.S. Supreme Court reshaped marriage through its sex discrimination
jurisprudence); see also Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 122 (2010).
6. The first decision on same-sex marriage by the Mexican Supreme Court is a good example:
[W]hat is constitutionally established is the protection of the family—its organization and
development—leaving to the legislature to guarantee it in a way that specifically leads to its
promotion and protection by the State but without such constitutional protection referring to
or be limited to one type of family, such as the nuclear one (father, mother, and children),
which would even require that the family was formed exclusively through marriage and that
this may be a requirement for the constitutional protection of the family to “proceed.”
Therefore, if the Constitution does not exclusively protect the family that comes from or that
it is constituted through such institution [marriage], since the protection is to the family, then
within a democratic rule of law in which the respect for plurality is of its essence, what must
be understood as constitutionally protected is the family as social reality and, therefore, such
protection must cover all forms and expressions existing in today’s reality, including those
families formed through marriage, through de facto unions, by a father or mother with his or
her children (mono-parental family), or any other that may represent a similar link.
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autonomy rights, it becomes very difficult to justify its privileged treatment
vis a vis other emotional associations.7 Other courts, however, have limited
the discussion of same-sex marriage to the right of same-sex couples to
access this institution, based on the value of marriage itself.8 Such a
limitation is only possible when one assumes that marriage and family are
one single institution.9 This conceptualization of marriage moves the
debate on marriage from a normative area designed to recognize and value
only the married family, to one based on equality and autonomy in which
family law protects differently constructed families. By treating marriage
and family as two sides of the same coin, countries are trapped in a rigid
family law structure that leaves too many individuals unprotected.
This Article reviews decisions that have made marriage available to
same-sex couples in different countries. In the short term, all of these
decisions have an impact on the lives of same-sex couples that were denied
access to marriage as the defining institution of family formation. In the
long term, however, some of these decisions will have a more profound
impact on family protection than others. Decisions from countries that have
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010,
Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. (Mex.), available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/
ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=115026.
7. See id. Even before the struggle for the legal recognition of same-sex couples, autonomy and
equality were used to challenge the distinction between married and unmarried heterosexual couples.
Individual claims for equal treatment in the area of torts show the tension between privileging marriage
and recognizing that unmarried couples may be substantially equal to married ones. The conflict
between protecting marriage and accepting the suffering of an unmarried partner as equally worthy of
protection as the suffering of a married partner is well reflected in Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255
(2003). In many countries, heterosexual unmarried couples were granted benefits similar to married
couples before the granting any benefits to same-sex couples. In the case of Australia, benefits to
unmarried heterosexual couples started in the 1980s. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES,
ADVISORY REPORT, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AMENDMENT BILL 2012 AND MARRIAGE AMENDMENT BILL
2012 (Cth) 13 (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_
of_representatives_committees?url=spla/bill%20marriage/report/index.htm.
8. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008). These two cases accept that there is a right to choose
who to marry. At the same time, both decisions analyze marriage as an institution essential to the wellfunctioning of society.
9. In re Marriage Cases seems to view marriage as the exclusive door to family formation:
Society . . . has an overriding interest in the welfare of children, and the role marriage plays in
facilitating a stable family setting in which children may be raised by two loving parents
unquestionably furthers the welfare of children and society . . . . It is these features that the
California authorities have in mind in describing marriage as the “basic unit” or “building
block” of society.
183 P.3d at 423. Many constitutional provisions as well as international conventions refer to marriage
and family in the same provision and it is not clear if the intent is to treat marriage and family as one
single concept, as two separate concepts, or as two connected concepts where marriage is viewed as a
unique door to family formation. For an analysis of marriage and family in constitutional texts and
conventions see infra Part II.B.
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sanctioned same-sex marriage reveal deeper understandings of marriage
and family law than just a simple score in favor of same-sex marriage. For
example, there are two clear directions in the Western world.10 On the one
hand, there is a movement to keep marriage as the paradigm of family law,
maintaining its value as an institution that makes society better.11 This is
the direction that some courts, including the Supreme Court of the United
States, appear to have taken thus far.12 On the other hand, there is also a
shift away from valuing marriage as the main gateway to family formation,
and towards emphasizing the value of alternative social family
constructions.13 This shift is the natural consequence of decisions based on
equality and autonomy, as seen in decisions from Canada, South Africa,
Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Spain, and Colombia.
Further, the decisions analyzed below demonstrate that the arguments
brought by parties for and against same-sex marriage are repeated across
countries, regardless of cultural differences. They also show comparative
law at work. Many decisions outside the United States cite decisions by
foreign courts on same or similar topics. Even when foreign decisions are
not cited, the briefs and amicus briefs presented to the court reference
decisions by foreign courts. There is, therefore, an incontestable influence
of foreign decisions when it comes to same-sex marriage litigation.
10. “Western world” can mean different things. In this paper, I use the term, following Harold
Berman, as a cultural rather than a geographic term. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 2 (1983). Both Europe and the Americas,
however, are also geographically part of the Western legal tradition. At the same time, South Africa has
embraced a constitutional system influenced by the Western legal tradition. The influence of RomanDutch law in South Africa is well documented. See, e.g., SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 37–45 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser eds., 2012). South Africa’s
constitutional law is also influenced by the West, especially by values of equality and dignity postapartheid. See HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 45–82
(2010).
11. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage is Good for America, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2008 at
A9 (“[A world without marriage] is a world of fragile families living on the shadowy outskirts of the
law; a world marked by heightened fear of loneliness or abandonment in crisis or old age; a world in
some respects not even civilized, because marriage is the foundation of civilization.”). Many same-sex
advocates embraced early on in the struggle for same-sex marriage the argument that marriage was
good for same-sex couples because it was good for everyone. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty
and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 855–56 (2014) [hereinafter
Franklin, Marrying Liberty].
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 425; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013).
13. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2009); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the
Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 573 (2005).
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This Article compares arguments made by courts that have protected
same-sex marriage in order to demonstrate to future litigators and judges
that expanding the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples can
either strengthen marriage to the detriment of families formed outside
marriage, or strengthen family diversity without having to sacrifice samesex marriage at all.
Part I describes the main arguments found in decisions from South
Africa, Europe, and the Americas granting same-sex marriage. Despite
cultural differences, advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage have
used similar arguments in different countries. This shows how courts have
reinforced the marriage paradigm by affirming same-sex marriage, while
others have granted same-sex marriage by reinforcing the rights to equality
and autonomy. This second argument ultimately opens the door to equal
recognition of the legal worth of married and unmarried families.
Part II explains why it is problematic to use marriage as the paradigm
of family law and legal protection. It shows the current disconnect between
families that exist regardless of their legal recognition, and the married
family as the aspirational family that legal systems generally embrace and
support. This section ends with two illustrations that reveal what happens
when courts miss the opportunity to look at social families and conform to
a legal structure based on marriage. It demonstrates that when decisions are
based on the inherent value of marriage, they may end up ignoring real
family ties formed between different individuals.
Part III analyzes the role of judicial borrowing in same-sex marriage
adjudication. It shows how the most recent decisions on same-sex marriage
use foreign law and international law—even when it is not binding—to
support their own local decisions. In this context, comparative law is used
in two different ways. First, courts use arguments used in foreign decisions
that seem compelling and pertinent to the case at hand. Second, courts use
comparative law to illustrate international trends in a particular area. This
tendency reinforces the idea that the arguments presented to courts, and
ultimately used by courts to support or reject same-sex marriage, may
eventually transcend national borders.
Part IV summarizes the two main options for same-sex protection
advanced so far by supreme or constitutional courts. On the one hand,
there is the possibility of maintaining marriage as the most important
institution for family formation, and on the other hand, courts can advance
grounds for a new family law based on the rights of equality and autonomy.
Finally, Part V concludes that more courts are basing their decisions to
uphold same-sex marriage on equality and autonomy than on marriage as
an essentially good institution, although some courts still use the rationale
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of marriage as the family law paradigm. Part V also concludes that most
courts use the concept of human dignity to support same-sex marriage,
although what human dignity means varies from court to court. At the same
time, this Article shows that many decisions refer to the need for legal
systems to adapt to social realities, which in turn will provide opportunities
for unmarried families to be recognized as such. Finally, this Article
concludes that comparative law matters to courts reviewing same-sex
marriage, and that courts look to one another when deciding these
important issues.
I. SIMILAR DISCOURSES ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
As of July 2014, same-sex marriage was available in eighteen
countries.14 The shift from marriage as a union between a man and a
woman to a union of two individuals regardless of their sex has been the
result of legal decisions,15 or the consequence of a political process.16 In
some cases, recognition has been the result of a legislative change later
confirmed by supreme or constitutional courts.17 In rare cases, recognition
has been triggered by courts mandating that legislatures seek a solution for
same-sex couples, or rejecting political processes against same-sex
marriage.18

14. Same-sex marriage is available in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France,
Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
Uruguay, parts of the United States, and parts of Mexico. On June 18, 2014 Luxembourg’s legislature
approved same-sex marriage. It will be available in 2015. See Loi du 4 juillet 2014 portant de réforme
du mariage [Law of July 4, 2014 on the Reform of Marriage], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ
DE LUXEMBOURG [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], July 17, 2014, p. 1798, available at
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&id=6172A#.
15. Brazil has adopted this approach. See infra note 26. For a complete account of decisions in
the United States, see FREEDOM TO MARRY, www.freedomtomarry.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). The
Supreme Court of Mexico has also issued three decisions allowing same-sex marriage in the State of
Oaxaca, and there are several writs of amparo [protection] claiming marriage equality pending
throughout the country. Since Mexican decisions only affect the direct claimants, these decisions don’t
have the effect of overruling the Civil Code’s definition of marriage in Oaxaca, or any other Mexican
State. Same-sex couples wishing to marry must apply for a marriage license and be rejected. After
being rejected, they are eligible to file a writ of amparo and wait for a favorable decision. See infra note
28.
16. This was the case in Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, England and Wales, Luxembourg, the State of
Quintana Roo in Mexico (through a mandate of its Secretary of State), and the states of New
Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Maine, Maryland, Washington, Rhode Island, Delaware, Minnesota,
Hawaii, Illinois, and the District of Columbia in the United States.
17. This occurred in Canada, Federal District of Mexico, Spain, Portugal, and France.
18. See, e.g., Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). Colombia’s Constitutional Court followed
South Africa’s model but its Congress failed to follow the Constitutional Court’s decision when it
rejected a same-sex marriage bill on April 24, 2013. See Isabel Colomna, Plenaria de Senado no
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By the end of 2014, there were more than thirty decisions reasoning
that same-sex marriage is either constitutionally mandated or allowed. This
Article analyzes eight decisions from state supreme courts or circuit courts
in the United States that have resulted in legal marriage for same-sex
couples,19 and United States v. Windsor, the United States Supreme Court
decision that declared Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)
unconstitutional.20 This Article also analyzes a majority of available
decisions from the highest courts in countries outside the United States that
provided substantive rulings in favor of same-sex marriage.21 In
chronological order these are: Canada,22 South Africa,23 Portugal,24 Mexico
(for the Federal District of Mexico),25 Brazil,26 Colombia,27 Mexico (for the
State of Oaxaca),28 and Spain.29

respaldo matrimonio Igualitario (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.senado.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/
item/16987-plenaria-no-aprobo-matrimonio-igualitario. In Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006),
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that same-sex couples were entitled to the same rights and
benefits as heterosexual couples. Like the Colombian Constitutional Court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court gave the legislature the option of amending the marriage statutes or enact a parallel system. See
id. The New Jersey legislature chose the latter and established a civil union system. In 2013 the New
Jersey Supreme Court declared that dual system unconstitutional. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82
A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2013). California is a combination of change triggered by
legal decisions and decisions rejecting political processes against same-sex marriage. See; Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
19. See Garden State, 82 A.3d 336; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 941
(Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719,
2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014);
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
20. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
21. I excluded from this analysis the decision by the Constitutional Council of France issued in
2013, since it mostly discusses whether the Constitution would allow the legislature to amend the
concept of marriage. See generally Conseil Constitutionneil [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No.
2013-669, May 17, 2013 (Fr.).
22. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.).
23. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
24. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367
(Port.).
25. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. (Mex.), available at
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=115026.
26. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.); see also Resolução No. 175, 14 de Maio de
2013, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Braz.) (basing its decision on the ruling by the Supreme
Federal Tribunal and prohibiting public officers from rejecting same-sex marriages).
27. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).
28. Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo
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Decisions on same-sex marriage tend to utilize similar arguments
regardless of cultural and legal differences. This Part focuses specifically
on three sets of recurring arguments. The first set is composed of promarriage arguments centered on the idea that marriage makes society
better. These arguments do not challenge the premise that family law
should be anchored primarily in the institution of marriage. Rather, they
adopt a “conformist” position that accepts the status quo. The second set of
arguments centers on the role of equality and autonomy in making marriage
available to couples of the same sex. The third recurring argument in these
decisions uses dignity as a type of basic constitutional value or right upon
which to base the grant of same-sex marriage. Dignity in the context of
same-sex marriage decisions has been used to emphasize different
constitutional rights or values. For example, South Africa and Mexico use
dignity differently from Mexico and Brazil, who in turn differ from the
United States Supreme Court’s use of the concept. The combination of
equality and autonomy arguments with the concept of dignity provides a
new framework for family law that has the potential to transform it by
abandoning the marriage paradigm.
A. Reinforcing the marriage paradigm
The first set of recurring arguments assumes that marriage is
essentially good for society and individuals.30 The argument advances a
pro-marriage perspective that disagrees over who should enter marriage,
but nevertheless supports marriage as the paradigm of family formation.
Among pro-marriage advocates, some consider heterosexuality central to
the view of marriage as an essentially “good” institution, especially as a

en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012 (Mex.), available at http://www2.scjn.
gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=143969; see also Primera Sala de la
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 152/2013,
Décima Época, 23 de Abril de 2014, slip op. (Mex.) (favoring 39 plaintiffs from the State of Oaxaca
and declaring the Civil Code unconstitutional for discriminating against gay and lesbian individuals
who were afforded protection as a suspect category). This decision, like previous decisions on writ of
amparo, only benefitted the plaintiffs in this particular case.
29. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 168) (Spain).
30. See Franklin, Marrying Liberty, supra note 11, at 855–56 (providing a brief account of these
arguments by advocates of same-sex marriage); but see Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN]
[Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip
op. ¶ 25–183, available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?
AsuntoID=115026 (outlining the arguments provided by Mexico’s Attorney General challenging samesex marriage in Mexico City); see also SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 3
(summarizing arguments pro and against same-sex marriage by scholars, civil society and religious
actors).
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precondition to procreation.31 Others promote same-sex marriage precisely
because marriage as an institution makes society better.32 For both sides,
however, marriage remains at the center of family law as an institution that
societies should embrace. Although there are some variations, these
arguments either assume or eventually conclude that marriage is a good
thing for society and for the individuals who enter into a marriage. At its
core, this argument represents the idealist view of marriage and its
purposes.
The United States has an extensive history of protecting marriage
based on an argument advancing marriage for marriage’s sake. Three
decisions from different periods demonstrate that U.S. courts have treated
marriage as vital to the structure of American society.33 As early as 1888,
the Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill stated that marriage “is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”34
By the mid twentieth century, the Court maintained its narrative of
marriage as essential to American society and the survival of humankind.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court declared that “[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.”35 Finally, in 1978, the Court affirmed marriage as a constitutional
right in Zablocki v. Redhail. In Zablocki, the Court referred to marriage as
a foundational institution: “it would make little sense to recognize a right of
privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in
31. See, e.g., SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 93–95; Conseil Constitutionnel,
No. 2013-669, ¶ 17; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d at 882; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.
2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871 (N.M. 2013).
32. American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER) was the sponsor of the constitutional
challenge to Proposition 8 in California that amended California’s Constitution to define marriage as a
union between a man and a woman. On their website, AFER states that “[n]o one should be denied the
freedom to marry the person he or she loves. Using the latest polling and medical research, AFER has
put together the best materials that make the case for why marriage equality is important and a
fundamental right that benefits society.” AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, Resources, http://www.afer.
org/our-work/resources/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (emphasis added). Among scholars supporting
same-sex marriage for the quality of marriage, see ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE,
supra note 3, at 8. Eskridge, however, does not advocate for a monolithic system where marriage should
be the exclusive gateway to family formation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law
Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J.
1881, 1890 (2012).
33. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
34. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211.
35. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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our society.”36
1. Conforming to the status quo.
Same-sex marriage advocates have employed the argument that
marriage is essentially good in order to justify expanded access to
marriage. The first paragraph of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health leaves no doubt
about the value that the Massachusetts Supreme Court ascribed to
marriage.37 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall
began the decision by stating “[m]arriage is a vital social institution. The
exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and
mutual support; it brings stability to our society.”38 The decision was a
full-throated defense of marriage that ultimately extended the right to
marry to same-sex couples.39 Several paragraphs were devoted to
explaining the benefits of marriage.40
Given that marriage in the U.S. is an undisputed constitutional right,
the court could not have advocated for same-sex marriage while criticizing
an institution placed by the Supreme Court at the top of the family law
structure. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, had a choice of
narrative: one based on equal access to an institution that provides tangible
legal benefits to couples, or one based on an idea of marriage as essentially
good. The court acknowledged the former when it stated that “[s]imply
put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil marriage
is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name implies: a
wholly secular institution.”41
This was the cue that would have allowed the court to move away
from the marriage paradigm and argue that similarly situated people should
have access to the same secular legal creation and the benefits to which
married couples are entitled. The focus, then, would have been on
discussing whether same-sex couples were indeed similarly situated to
heterosexual couples with access to marriage. The court could have further
elaborated on the state-created benefits of marriage42
The equal access line of reasoning would have allowed the Court to
reach the same holding, while leaving the following chapters of the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 968–69.
Id. at 955–57.
Id at 954.
See id. at 955–57.
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Dworkinian chain novel the option to expand on protections for families
formed outside marriage. Instead, the court focused on the need for
marriage in society:
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones. It is central to the way the
Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared
for and supported whenever possible from private rather than public
funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic
data . . . . Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry
is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.43

Only after explaining how important marriage was for society, did the
court move to the reasoning for equality.44 The decision stated that the
Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity and equality of all
individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”45 Although the
need to affirm the dignity and equality of all individuals may be obvious, it
is less clear whether marriage perfects society, or whether it only benefits
individuals by providing state-granted benefits.
It is easy to analyze decisions after they are issued and claim that the
litigants could have chosen a different strategy. Goodridge was one of the
first successful cases on same-sex marriage in the U.S. and as such, the
landscape was completely different when compared with the litigation
environment in the last few years.46 The litigants chose the strategy that
likely had the best possibility of success, given the legal environment in
that particular moment in time.47 For the litigants, marriage was desirable
for both idealistic and pragmatic reasons.48
43. Id. at 954–55.
44. See id. at 958–68.
45. The decision has two paragraphs about the tangible benefits of marriage and it affirms that
“[t]he benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect
of life and death. The department states that ‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to marriage and to marital
benefits.” Id. at 955–56.
46. For an account of the background and history of the Goodridge litigation, see Mary L.
Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 69 (2005).
47. Mary Bonauto explains how Massachusetts had moved towards an environment more
favorable to LGBT rights and the need to litigate same-sex marriage before detractors of same-sex
marriage started to push for a constitutional amendment to restrict marriage to one man and one woman.
Id. at 27.
48. Mary Bonauto tells us that Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) encountered
many same-sex couples who “wished to make [their] commitments legally binding and to share in the
community of those who have made marriage vows. This should not be surprising, because LGBT
people are part of the larger culture in which marriage represents the ideal institution of connection and
commitment.” Id. at 4. At the same time, she recognized that “the fifty dollars a couple spends on a
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The Supreme Court of California also used a narrative that reinforced
a differentiated status between married and unmarried couples.49 Citing a
prior decision, the court in In re Marriages Cases linked marriage and the
family as if they were one unique institution:
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal
affections that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological
drives that might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures
the care and education of children in a stable environment; it
establishes continuity from one generation to another; it nurtures
and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free
people. Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to
foster and preserve marriage.50

The narrative of marriage as an institution that makes society better is
also found in more recent decisions on same-sex marriage. In Geiger v.
Kitzhaber, the court’s description of the parties starts by stating, “[a]ll of
the plaintiffs share in the characteristics that we would normally look to
when we describe the ideals of marriage and family.”51 Later, the court
turns to an argument provided by the State in the plaintiff’s favor:
Simply put, marriage matters. It matters not only for the individuals
who decide to enter into the civil union, but also for the state. This
is why the state links so many rights and protections to the decision
to marry. Strong, stable marriages create unions in which children
may be raised to become healthy and productive citizens, in which
family members care for those who are sick or in need and would
otherwise have to rely on government assistance, and through which
community is built and strengthened.52

The conformist approach to marriage makes little sense in light of the
oft-cited quote from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, also cited in Lawrence
v. Texas and Goodridge, on the role of the judiciary: “[o]ur obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”53 How is the
protection of marriage over all other emotional associations not a mandate
of a particular moral code?

marriage license will buy them more protection than any set of lawyers’ documents ever will.” Id. at 6.
49. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
50. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422. The same decision cites Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d
582 (Cal. 1998), in which the California Supreme Court, citing prior decisions, stated that “[t]he joining
of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling
relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422.
51. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (D. Or. 2014) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 1137.
53. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass.
2003).
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Nevertheless, Goodridge triggered a positive outcome by allowing
hundreds of people to access benefits that were restricted to married
individuals.54 However, Goodridge did not make same-sex marriage an
issue about the protection of families. Instead, Goodridge reinforced the
primacy of families formed by marriage, leaving out any mention of
families formed outside of marriage. Moreover, the court employed a
narrative of assimilation between same-sex couples and heterosexual
couples. The decision ensures that readers see the plaintiffs as “equal” to
the typical heterosexual middle class American family when it states that
“[t]he plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment
banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in
church, community, and school groups.”55
Some of the most recent state decisions on same-sex marriage follow
the same strategy of describing the plaintiffs as people who the reader may
see as one of their own.56 As Kenji Yoshino states, “gays ‘acting straight’
are more likely to win straight acceptance.”57 Showing that same-sex
couples that want to get married look just like any other heterosexual
couple is a double-edged sword that the LGBT rights movement is
constantly struggling with. On the one hand, the movement wants to show
that there is nothing different about same-sex couples that would prevent
them from functioning in society. On the other, it is difficult to determine
how much of this depiction corresponds with a description of individuals as
they truly are, or how much it is an act of surrender to the dominant
heterosexual culture. Equalizing depictions are more easily accepted by the
mainstream, helping to gain more support for a particular cause.58
Assimilation into the mainstream, however, can also end up destroying the

54. According to the Pew Research Center, between 2004 and 2012 there have been 22,406
marriages by same-sex couples in Massachusetts. Drew Desilver, How many same-sex marriages in the
U.S.? At least 71,165, probably more, FactTank, News in the Numbers, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June
26, 2013), available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/how-many-same-sexmarriages-in-the-u-s-at-least-71165-probably-more/.
55. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
56. See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 873–75 (N.M. 2013); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F.
Supp. 2d 410, 416–18 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1133.
57. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 80 (2006).
58. “‘When you’ve got an appealing litigant, it makes you want to side with them,’ Michael
Klarman, a professor at Harvard Law School and a former clerk for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said. ‘Of
course, you are deciding a case for a much broader group of litigants, so it ought to be irrelevant, but
it’s not. With school desegregation, the N.A.A.C.P. accepted only plaintiffs who were middle class,
from the best families, well educated, well dressed. When the American Jewish Congress was thinking
about school-prayer challenges, they much preferred a Jew to an atheist.’” Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife,
THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013) http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife.
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acceptance of diversity that LGBT individuals have longed for.59
2. Using the concept of human dignity to expand the protection of
the state to other emotional associations.
The concept of human dignity has been used in other countries to
overturn discriminatory statutes and practices.60 The use of human dignity
reinforces the principles of equality and autonomy that lend themselves to
the protection of diverse families, and not exclusively married families. In
the United States, human dignity is not a novel concept. Although there is
no explicit “dignity clause” in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. courts, like courts
in other countries, have based or at least supported constitutional decisions
on the premise of human dignity.61 As Jeremey Waldron points out, “there
does not seem to be any canonical definition of ‘dignity’ in the law.”62 Its
use, therefore, has varied throughout history and was only consistently used
as a universal value beginning in the second half of the twentieth century.63
Furthermore, dignity and human dignity are two different concepts that can
easily be associated with different historical phases. We learn from Erin
Daly that dignity was often used by the Supreme Court in the first half of
the twentieth century as a feature of certain institutions that enjoyed special
respect, such as courts, the Constitution, or the courthouse.64 The second
half of the twentieth century, however, marked the Court’s shift from
institutional dignity to human dignity.65
59. See generally Franke, supra note 13, at 239 (critiquing the problem of marriage and
assimilation, writing, “The creation of new gay publics outside City Hall, on the pages of the New York
Times, and on the six o’clock news are not exactly the gay publics the drag queens at Stonewall had in
mind.”).
60. Paolo Carozza, Human Dignity in Constitutional Adjudication in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459–66 (Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
61. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1737 (2008) (noting the invocation of dignity in opinions
interpreting individual rights guarantees in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65
MONT. L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (explaining that though the Constitution does not refer to dignity
explicitly “there are some cognate concepts in the Constitution’s text, such as the ban on cruel and
unusual punishments, the protections of the due process clause, and others that have been developed in
the U. S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.”).
62. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANKS, AND RIGHTS 15 (2012).
63. The first mention of dignity by the U.S. Supreme Court in an individual rights case was in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, but its use did not flourish in the Court’s case law until after the 1940s. ERIN
DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON 82, 87
(2012).
64. Id. at 71–79.
65. Although American courts pay less attention to international trends and developments than
their foreign colleagues, it seems that the narrative of human dignity in the U.S. was influenced, just as
other countries were, by the new international world order after Second World War. Id. at 82.
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In the last few decades, the United States Supreme Court and state
courts have employed the concept of human dignity to inform their
decisions on an array of issues.66 For example, Justice Kennedy has used
the concept of human dignity to enhance his decisions on the issues of
abortion and same-sex couples.67 In Goodridge, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court also used human dignity as a core element to support samesex marriage.68 Unfortunately, that court’s development of the concept was
blurred by its concurrent defense of marriage as an essentially good
institution.69
Human dignity is a complex concept that can have different
meanings.70 The possibility for different interpretations becomes clear
when one compares the use of dignity by the South African Constitutional
Court to Justice Kennedy’s use of dignity in Lawrence71 and Windsor.72
South Africa’s idea of dignity is closely related to a concept of equality
before the law.73 In contrast, Justice Kennedy used a concept of human
dignity related to liberty and autonomy in Lawrence, and shifted to an
institutional concept of dignity enjoyed by the married couple in Windsor.74
This seems to be a return to the early twentieth-century approach

66. See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 201, 202 (2008) (explaining that since the 1940s the Supreme Court has increasingly employed
dignity to broaden, explain and develop Constitutional protections); Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the
Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the Reluctant Recognition
of A Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 381 (2011).
67. Siegel, supra note 61, at 1737 (discussing abortion).
68. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948, 965 (Mass. 2003). It may not be a
coincidence that Justice Marshall is from South Africa where dignity is a core constitutional concept.
69. Id. at 957.
70. Daly, supra note 66, at 61; see generally Stu Woolman, The Architecture of Dignity, in THE
DIGNITY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA: CASES AND MATERIALS
76 (Drucilla Cornell et. al. eds., 2013) (identifying five meanings of dignity in South African
constitutional case law).
71. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
72. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
73. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 49–50, ¶ 78 (S. Afr.)
(“[W]hat the applicants in this matter seek is not the right to be left alone, but the right to be
acknowledged as equals and to be embraced with dignity by the law.”).
74. The first paragraph of Lawrence clearly states that the constitutionality of the sodomy statutes
is a matter of liberty: “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Later, the decision states
that “[i]t suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.” Id. at 567.
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characterizing dignity as status or as respect owed to an institution. The
Ninth Circuit employed a similar approach in Perry v. Brown, indicating
that the state conferred dignity to the “highest form of a committed
relationship [marriage] and to the individuals who have entered into it.”75
Dignity has been conceptualized differently in other areas of the law.
In the abortion context, Reva Siegel has identified three different meanings
of dignity: “dignity of life, dignity of liberty, and dignity as equality.”76 In
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy also referred to dignity mainly as a
consequence of liberty.77 People who choose their partner and engage in
sexual conduct “in the confines of their homes and their own private
lives . . . still retain their dignity as free persons.”78 Dignity in this context
refers to the right of individuals to be fully autonomous in choosing their
partners without diminishing their status as human beings worthy of
recognition. The decision states that “[t]he liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”79
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy was once again presented with the
opportunity to advance an American constitutional concept of dignity.
Adhering to Lawrence, he employed the concept of dignity as linked to
liberty as a basis for overthrowing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
The decision, however, added the concept of dignity as derived from
marriage. In other words, people retain their dignity by having the
possibility of entering into a marriage. It seems that dignity comes not so
much from the ability to choose to marry (or to choose not to marry), but
from the status of being married:
It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had
not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex
might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man
and woman in lawful marriage. For marriage between a man and a
woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to
the very definition of that term and to its role and function
throughout the history of civilization.80

The idea of dignity derived from marriage is reinforced again when
Justice Kennedy writes:
By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages performed
in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and
same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012).
Siegel, supra note 61, at 1737.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
Id. at 567.
Id. This is also the Mexican approach as discussed below. See infra I.B.2.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
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and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to be
married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate
relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State
worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.
It reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving
understanding of the meaning of equality.81

Although Windsor is not a decision on the constitutionality of samesex marriage, it changed the landscape of same-sex marriage litigation.82
According to the organization Freedom to Marry, by October 2014, less
than two years after Windsor, there were more than eighty cases
challenging traditional marriage statutes, with more than forty decisions
favoring same-sex marriage, and only two decisions rejecting same-sex
marriage.83 Of the twenty-four final decisions, two followed the
institutional dignity narrative of Windsor.84 Although both Geiger and
Whitewood v. Wolf also reference the tangible rights and benefits that come
with marriage, they use a strong institutional dignity narrative based on
Windsor.85 They speak of humiliation, degradation, and stigma,86 and
borrow from Windsor’s narrative on dignity to explain the humiliation
faced by the children of the plaintiffs.87
It is clear that U.S. courts are using dignity to justify decisions in

81. Id. at 2692–93.
82. A year after Windsor, more than 70 cases from all states/territories without same-sex marriage
had been litigated or were pending in U.S. courts. For an accurate up to date account, see FREEDOM TO
MARRY, www.freedomtomarry.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).
83. See id. The two decisions against same-sex marriage are Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No.
2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014), and Robicheaux et. al v. Caldwell, 2 F.
Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). In Borman the plaintiff challenged Tennessee’s Anti-Recognition Law
that declares void and unenforceable in Tennessee out of state valid marriages if prohibited by
Tennessee. The decision states that Windsor did not “give an opinion concerning whether a State must
accept as valid a same-sex marriage allowed in another State.” Borman, 2014 WL 4251133, at *3. The
opinion found that “the laws and the Constitution of Tennessee do not deny equal protection because
they do not burden a fundamental right, target a suspect class or intentionally treat one differently that
others similarly situated without any rational basis or difference.” Id. In Robicheaux a U.S. District
Court decided that “[t]he State of Louisiana has a legitimate interest under a rational basis standard of
review for addressing the meaning of marriage through the democratic process,” dismissing the
challenge to Louisiana’s ban on same-sex marriage and lack of recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages. Robicheaux, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 913.
84. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F.
Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
85. Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
86. Id. at 1136, 1139; Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
87. Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (“In the words of Deb
Whitewood, ‘[the lack of same-sex marriage] sends the message to our children that their family is less
deserving of respect and support than other families. That’s a hurtful message.’”).
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different areas. It is not clear, however, that all courts are using dignity as
a univocal concept. In the case of gay and lesbian rights, we see a concept
of human dignity attached to freedom of choice, and a concept of
institutional dignity attached to marriage. Which one will prevail depends
on how this concept continues developing in the future.
The second use of dignity harkens back to institutional dignity as
applied by the Court in the first half of the twentieth century. This is not a
universal concept of dignity. Rather, it is selective because it does not
apply to all institutions. According to the Court, only some institutions
possess dignity, and marriage is one of them. The use of dignity in
Windsor as derived from marriage curtails freedom. As the rationale goes,
some choices are better than others, even if the alternatives do not violate
equality, due process, or any other constitutional right. Under this theory,
marriage provides couples with a kind of dignity that unmarried couples
cannot access.
B. Dignity, equality, and autonomy: the transformation of family law
through same-sex marriage
The second set of arguments in litigation dealing with same-sex
marriage is based on a claim for equality and autonomy. This argument
supports extending marriage to same-sex couples because it is the right
thing to do, and not because marriage is essentially good, but because
similarly situated groups of people should be treated equally. Arbitrarily
depriving one group of people a right that another group enjoys cannot
have a reasonable aim. Same-sex marriage advocates within this debate
agree that marriage should be expanded, but not all of them assert as a
primary reason that marriage is essential to society.88 At the forefront of
equalization between married and unmarried individuals, it is thus possible
to find same-sex marriage advocates for pragmatic reasons and advocates
of equal treatment between married and unmarried people. These
arguments do not require courts to take a position on the importance of
marriage as an institution. These arguments reinforce individual rights,
such as equality and autonomy, as core elements of society. Whether it is
marriage, contraceptives, jobs, or healthcare, a benefit granted to
heterosexuals should be granted to everyone else that is similarly situated.
Within this context, the focus of the same-sex marriage debate shifts
from the legal meaning of marriage to the meaning of equality, autonomy,
or both. The decisions analyzed below share a similar rationale. Each one
allows constitutional principles to take on an evolving role to accommodate
88. See Polikoff, supra note 13, at 593.
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new situations. All of these decisions tackle different arguments presented
to the court by the parties to the litigation. However, they all refer to
concepts of equality and autonomy as the grounds for providing rights to
same-sex couples, and moving towards the recognition of same-sex
marriage. This is the case in Canada, South Africa, Mexico, Spain,
Portugal, Brazil, Colombia, and, with some limitations, the U.S. state of
Iowa.
Additionally, most of these decisions refer to dignity as a foundation
for granting same-sex marriage.89 Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in
Windsor, other courts have linked dignity to equality and autonomy.90
South Africa mostly refers to dignity as a quality that provides all
individuals with equality of worth.91 Mexico, Brazil, Spain, and Colombia
refer to dignity as linked to the right to autonomy, especially in the context
of making decisions on family formation.92 Finally, all of these decisions
refer to constitutional principles that adapt to new realities, or refer to a
constitutional protection of the family in which what constitutes a family
depends on the social construction of that concept.93

89. The exception to this trend is Canada. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage does not mention
dignity as a part of its reasoning. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). The
Supreme Court of Canada has struggled with the use of human dignity as a constitutional value.
Although it was a common ground in decisions until the 1990s, the “Law test” established in the case
Law v. Canada required the party arguing discrimination to show injury to dignity. See Law v. Canada,
[1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can). In 2008, the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed that “the protection of all of
the rights guaranteed by the Charter has as its lodestar the promotion of human dignity.” R. v. Kapp,
[2008] S.C.R. 483, 504 (Can.). It did, however, criticize it as “an abstract and subjective notion” that
can “become confusing and difficult to apply;” and a standard that had “proven to be an additional
burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.” Id. For
an analysis of the use of dignity by the Supreme Court of Canada, see James R. Fyfe, Dignity as
Theory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 70 SASK. L. REV.
1–27 (2007).
90. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); Pleno de la Suprema
Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Suprme Court], Acción De inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10
de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶¶ 260, 262, 269, 315 (Mex.); S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO
A
DA REPÚBLICA, 2 SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 (Port.); S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (B.O.E., No. 286, p.
168) (Spain); Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).
91. See Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 11, 15, 26, 28, 31, 47, 50, 53, 78, 79, 80, 108, 114 and 115. In a few
paragraphs, like 36 and 54, the decision seems to link dignity with privacy. Id. ¶¶ 36, 54. In paragraphs
36, 48, and 95, the Court mentions dignity, equality and privacy. Id. ¶¶ 36, 48, 95. Finally, there are a
few paragraphs where it is unclear if the Court is referring to dignity as privacy, equality, or even as
status derived from marriage. Id. ¶¶ 57, 61, 80 and 88. Paragraph 115, however, leaves no doubt that
dignity for the Constitutional Court is closely linked to equality. Id. ¶ 115.
92. SCJN, Acción De Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶¶ 260, 262, 269, 315; S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012;
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11.
93. Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 15, 52, 57; SCJN, Acción De Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶¶ 235, 240,
242, 254, 311; S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 23; S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012.
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Transforming the debate from marriage to equality opens up different
fronts for advancing the protection of unmarried families. Equality
arguments require a comparison between the behaviors of married couples
with that of the group seeking equal protection. An equality discussion
requires an elevation of the actual substance of relationships over the
formality of a marriage certificate. A review of substantive reasons for
protecting certain associations over others forces us to look into the
functions that each association performs. Real change is triggered by
discussions on the basis of equality and autonomy. If societies value the
right of each individual to autonomously determine her personal life,
denying the right to family life outside the married family becomes difficult
to justify.
1. The right to equality of family associations: the South African and
Colombian approach to dignity and equality.
Several courts have used equality and equal protection arguments in
their decisions to allow same-sex marriage. Two of these stand out for the
richness of their analysis on equality and dignity. Both South Africa and
Colombia’s constitutional courts have based their decisions on same-sex
marriage in the constitutional value of dignity. Both courts provide an
analysis of equal protection based on the idea of human dignity.
Colombia’s 2011 decision on same-sex marriage created a legal limbo that
has ended with new cases on the Court’s docket.94 This section analyzes
the use of dignity and equality in both South Africa and Colombia. It ends
with brief analyses of other decisions worth mentioning in this context such
as those from Brazil, Portugal, and some U.S. courts.
a. South Africa
In 2005, the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided Minister of
Home Affairs v. Fourie, giving the legislature one year to pass legislation
that would allow same-sex couples to marry.95 The decision issued by
Justice Albie Sachs used a narrative based on equality and dignity from
beginning to end.96 It started by telling the story of Ms. Marié Adriaana
Fourie and Ms. Cecelia Johanna Bonthuys, applicants in the first of the two
cases that were decided together.97 The decision did not say anything about

94. Redacción Justicia, Corte Constitucional Revive Discusion sobre Matrimonio Gay
[Constitutional Court revives discussion on gay marriage], ELTIEMPO.COM (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.
eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13528410.
95. Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 156.
96. See id.
97. The second case against the Minister of Home Affairs was a case launched in the
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who the plaintiffs were or what they did for a living. The reader was only
told that they were both women.98
Finding themselves strongly attracted to each other, two people
went out regularly and eventually decided to set up home together.
After being acknowledged by their friends as a couple for more than
a decade, they decided that the time had come to get public
recognition and registration of their relationship, and formally to
embrace the rights and responsibilities they felt should flow from
and attach to it. Like many persons in their situation, they wanted
to get married. There was one impediment. They are both women.99

The Court did not labor to present the plaintiffs as similar to
heterosexual married couples. The plaintiffs were presented as just two
people who “eventually decided to set up home together.”100 This narrative
of the facts is very different from the one that the Massachusetts Supreme
Court presented in Goodridge. The South African story is about two people
who care for each other and want to get married. Goodridge, however, is
about how same-sex couples seeking to get married were similar to all
other heterosexual middle-class couples with access to marriage. In Fourie
we do not know whether the women in the case are professionals or on
welfare, nor do we know if they are active members of a church or
agnostics. In Fourie, the Court first addressed if the law “den[ied] equal
protection to and discriminate[d] unfairly against same-sex couples by not
including them in the provisions of the Marriage Act.”101 The government
advanced two arguments against the plaintiffs. First, the government
argued there was no constitutional right to marry.102 The Constitution
“merely guaranteed to same-sex couples the right to establish their own
forms of family life without interference from the state.”103 Second,
marriage was historically and by nature a heterosexual institution.104 The
Court answered both claims in a way that reinforced the principles of
equality and the role of the South African Constitution in protecting
families over marriages. The Court reasoned that although the right to
marry may not be in the Constitution, “[i]t does not follow . . . that the
Constitution does nothing to protect that right, and with it, the concomitant

Johannesburg High Court on July 8, 2004 by the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and eighteen others
in the Equality Project. See id. ¶ 44.
98. Id. ¶ 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. ¶ 45.
102. Id. ¶ 46.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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right to be treated equally and with dignity in the exercise of that right.”105
These words marked the beginning of the court’s transformational
approach to same-sex marriage. Fourie did not dismiss marriage as an
institution that should not be protected. On the contrary, it devoted several
paragraphs to explaining the benefits of marriage. There were, however,
no arguments advocating that marriage is by its very nature good for
society. The Court’s arguments were all based on tangible and intangible
benefits and duties attached to legal marriages. Among them, the duty to
support one another was explained as one of the most important
consequences of marriage.106 The decision also referred to consequences
for the distribution of property and parental obligations.107 The overall tone
of the decision emphasized that the meaning of marriage is not as important
as the fact that it is a private choice that should be available, for the sake of
equality and dignity, to same-sex couples.
Fourie, therefore, was not a decision that rested on marriage, but
rather on equality. More important still, it was a decision that incorporated
a concept of equality which did not demand assimilation into the
heterosexual majority. To the contrary, the decision embraced diversity not
only with regard to individual choices, but also concerning the families that
South Africa is willing to protect. The lack of information about Ms.
Fourie and her partner Ms. Bonthouys is essential to the point the court is
making about diversity, both on the individual and familial levels.
In particular, three full paragraphs of the decision were devoted to
explaining “the right to be different.”108 This section of the decision started
with an explanation of the role of the modern South African Constitution in
representing “a radical rupture with a past based on intolerance and
exclusion, and the movement forward to the acceptance of the need to
develop a society based on equality and respect by all for all.”109 The
decision went on to embrace individual diversity as a main component of
equality: “[e]quality means equal concern and respect across difference. It
does not presuppose the elimination or suppression of difference.”110
Here, it is important to note what the Fourie Court did not do.
Accepting the right to be different does not prevent a country from favoring
one type of family association over others. Marriage, therefore, could have
been defended as the preferred family association and the Court could have
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. ¶ 47.
Id. ¶ 65.
Id. ¶ 66–67.
Id. ¶ 59–61.
Id. ¶ 59.
Id. ¶ 60.
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granted it a privileged status while at the same time embracing individual
diversity.111 Yet it refrained from doing so, stating that the “family as
contemplated by the Constitution can be constituted in different ways and
legal conceptions of the family and what constitutes family life should
change as social practices and traditions change . . .”112 Explaining why
marriage is not a constitutional right, the decision states, “South Africa has
a multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the
only socially and legally acceptable one.”113
It could be argued that the multiculturalism specific to South Africa
forms the basis for the Court’s decision to allow same-sex marriage. From
this perspective, the Court’s decision could be viewed as a discussion based
on local traditions that cannot be used to establish any commonalities with
foreign decisions. In 2005, however, no ethnic South African groups
performed same-sex marriages as part of their traditions.114 In addition to
the Marriage Act of 1961, there was also a statute recognizing customary
marriages.115 Therefore, the Court could have concluded that associations
not included in the two statutes regulating marriage were foreign to the
South African Constitution. It decided, however, to rest its decision on the
constitutional principles of dignity and equality, and broaden the scope of
family protection.

111. Although there is no express right to marriage in the South African Constitution, the
document establishes under Article 15 on Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion that its protection
“does not prevent legislation recognizing marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of
religious, personal or family law.” There is enough textual foundation to justify a protection of marriage
over other associations. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
112. Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 15.
113. Id. ¶ 59.
114. The first traditional same-sex wedding in South Africa was celebrated on April of 2013. See
Africa’s first traditional gay wedding: Men make history as they marry in full tribal costume,
DAILYMAIL.COM (Apr. 9, 2013, 4:06 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2306180/Africa-straditional-gay-wedding-Men-make-history-marry-tribal-costume—say-t-wait-parents.html#ixzz
3GYIJJh5D. According to South African LGBT rights advocate Melanie Judge, when the bill on samesex marriage was before the South African Parliament in 2006, “the Congress of Traditional Leaders of
South Africa (Contralesa) submitted that ‘the institution of traditional leadership is the sole and
authentic voice of the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa living in traditional
communities . . . [and that] same-sex marriage is against nature, culture (all types of culture), religion
and common sense, let alone decency,’” Melanie Judge, The culture of the chiefs is a set-back for
gender and sexual rights, QUEERY: QUESTIONING THE (NOT SO) OBVIOUS (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://queery.oia.co.za/2012/04/the-culture-of-the-chiefs-is-a-set-back-for-gender-and-sexual-rights/.
115. Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (S. Afr.). South Africa regulates customary marriages through the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act N. 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.). The Act regulates marriages
“concluded in accordance with customary law.” Id. § 1. Customary law “means the customs and usages
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of
the culture of those peoples.” Id.
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South Africa is famous for using dignity as a main pillar of
constitutional doctrine.116 The 2005 Fourie decision referred more than
forty times to the concept of dignity as a justification for opening marriage
to couples of the same sex.117 Dignity, as used by the South African
Constitutional Court, is closely tied to the inherent equality of all human
beings. In the words of the late Justice Arthur Chaskalson,
Acknowledging that dignity is a difficult concept to capture in
precise terms, the Constitutional Court has held that the
constitutional protection of dignity requires us at the least “to
acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of
our society” and to treat all with “equal respect and concern.”
Building on that has given dignity a central role in the Court’s
evolving jurisprudence.118

The strong protection of dignity as a form of equality comes from an
explicit reference to dignity in the South African Constitution,119 and a
history of massive racial discrimination under apartheid.120 Dignity is a
principle of equality of worth.121 Early in the Fourie decision, Justice Sachs
cited Justice Cameron’s lower court decision:
The sting of the past and continuing discrimination against both
gays and lesbians’ lies in the message it conveys, namely, that
viewed as individuals or in their same-sex relationships, they “do
not have the inherent dignity and are not worthy of the human
respect possessed by and accorded to heterosexuals and their
relationships.” This “denies to gays and lesbians that which is
foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality and
dignity” namely that “all persons have the same inherent worth and
dignity,” whatever their other differences may be.122

Fourie also characterizes dignity as autonomy. Justice Sachs wrote,
“the capacity to choose to get married enhances the liberty, the autonomy

116. Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our
Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 196 (2000) [hereinafter Chaskalson, Human
Dignity]; see also Woolman, supra note 70, at 73.
117. Fourie, SA 524.
118. Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity As A Constitutional Value: A South African
Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1377, 1382 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
119. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. §10 of the South African Constitution states that: “[e]veryone has
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.” Id.
120. “Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For
apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and
thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past and
affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and protection is the touchstone of the
new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution.” Chaskalson, Human Dignity, supra
note 116, at 1381.
121. Id.
122. Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 15.
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and the dignity of a couple committed for life to each other.”123 In other
words, it is not marriage per se that gives individuals dignity, instead,
dignity is derived from the capacity to choose to marry. Most of Fourie’s
references to dignity, however, relate to a sense of equality of worth that
necessarily leads to equality of treatment.124
The test, according to Justice Sachs, “whether majoritarian or
minoritarian positions are involved, must always be whether the measure
under scrutiny promotes or retards the achievement of human dignity,
equality and freedom.”125 Recognition of a human being’s worth and the
equality of treatment that follows from this recognition are at the core of
the South African concept of dignity.
Fourie not only opened the space for same-sex couples to access
marriage, but on its way to accomplishing that, it created the conditions
necessary for future decisions to focus on the protection of diverse families
outside the marriage paradigm.
b. Colombia
In 2011, the Colombia Constitutional Court (CCC) was asked to
review whether marriage limited to heterosexual couples was
unconstitutional. This development was inevitable, given the number of
decisions that the CCC had issued in the previous fourteen years regarding
the rights of same-sex couples.126 It was only a matter of time until the
right to marriage was also placed on the Court’s docket. Decision C577/11, however, fell short of declaring the lack of marriage for same-sex
couples unconstitutional. The CCC’s decision created a double standard for
the constitutional protection of LGBT rights.127
Similar to the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decision in
Fourie, the CCC’s ruling recognized a lack of protection for same-sex
couples.128 Both courts considered that their role was to acknowledge and
confront the inequality between same-sex and heterosexual couples, but to
leave the specific remedy for this inequality to the legislature.129 The CCC,
however, was less emphatic in its instructions to the Colombian Congress

123. Id. ¶ 16.
124. Id. ¶ 80.
125. Id. ¶ 94.
126. For an analysis of Colombian case law on LGBT rights see also Albarracin and Rivera, supra
note 4.
127. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).
128. Id.
129. Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 101; see also Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11.
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than the South African Constitutional Court. The Colombian decision did
not mandate the legislature to open up marriage to same-sex couples.
Instead, the Court explained that the legislature was the exclusive branch
with the freedom to choose specific protections for same-sex relationships
and to define the scope of those protections.130 Thus, the legislature was
instructed to grant same-sex couples wishing to formalize their union all
rights and obligations derived from the heterosexual marriage, either
through marriage, or through a different institution.131
The reasoning of the CCC is interesting because the Colombian
constitutional framework, like the South African Constitution, but unlike
most Latin American constitutions, openly recognizes the potential for
diverse family associations.132 The constitutional “family” therefore, is not
only the married family. The Colombian Constitution states that, in
addition to the legal ties of marriage, a family is formed by the responsible
desire to establish one.133 Consequently with the constitutional mandate,
the CCC reinforced its case law on family diversity, stating:
[T]he family that comes from the free union is also worthy of
constitutional protection and the Constitution places it on an equal
basis with the one that comes from marriage, because the State and
society guarantee an integral protection of the family “regardless of
its constitution by legal or natural ties” and, therefore, the honor,
dignity, and intimacy of the family are inviolable [and] the
legislator “cannot issue regulations that create a differentiated
treatment of rights and obligations between those who are married
and those who are part of a permanent union.”134

The decision could have followed the South African model, which
reasoned that as long as there were benefits attached to marriage, same-sex
couples that wanted to marry should have access to that institution.135 The
CCC, however, restricted itself to a more literal interpretation of the
Constitution that recognized heterosexual marriage as constitutionally
protected and, at the same time, honored its case law on equality and the
protection of the unmarried family.136 In order to do this, it affirmed that
the heterosexual nature of constitutionally protected marriage did not
hinder the possibility of protecting same-sex couples.137 Furthermore, the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 42.
Id.
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11.
Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 138–154.
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11.
The Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal had used the same reasoning before. The Tribunal
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CCC accepted the petitioner’s basic claim that the lack of a legal means for
same-sex couples to formalize their unions was unconstitutional.138 It did
not, however, accept the obvious result of that reasoning: that marriage
must be made available to same-sex couples. Instead, the CCC gave a
vague mandate to the legislature to provide same-sex couples with a
formality:
The legislature . . . has the task of finding a way to formalize and
solemnize a legal link between members of a same-sex couple who
may freely want to make use of it and, thus, the Court understands
that the freedom to give the name it may deem appropriate to that
link, as well as to define its scope, provided that, more than the
name, what matters are the specific provisions that identify the
rights and obligations distinctive to that legal relationship and the
way such relationships are formalized and solemnized is reserved to
the representative organ.139

The CCC thus referred the matter to the Colombian Congress, just as
other courts around the world have done before it. The CCC, however,
already had a robust case law in favor of equality and dignity of individuals
of different sexual orientations and gender identities.140 Accordingly, the

summarizes its options about the constitutionality of same-sex marriage as follows: a) same-sex
marriage can be a constitutional mandate, b) same-sex marriage is constitutionally forbidden, or c) the
constitution neither mandates nor prohibits same-sex marriage, and therefore Congress may regulate it.
S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367, 22370
(Port.). The Tribunal decided that the constitutional protection of heterosexual marriage did not forbid
the legislature from opening marriage to same-sex couples. Id.
138. Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. Same-sex couples already had access to de facto
unions.
139. Id.
140. See also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 30, 1994, Sentencia
T-539/1994 (Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the censorship of TV ads showing same-sex couples
kissing); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 9, 1998, Sentencia C-481/1998
(Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the discrimination of gays in the military); Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 18, 2003, Sentencia T-808/2003 (Colom.) (declaring
unconstitutional the exclusion of gays from the Boy Scouts organization in Colombia); Corte
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2007, Sentencia C-075/07 (Colom.) (declaring
that the property regime established for de facto heterosexual marital unions applied to same-sex
couples); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 3, 2007, Sentencia C-811/2007
(Colom.) (expanding to same-sex couples the right to include their partners into health care insurance
plans); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 2008, Sentencia C-336/2008
(Colom.) (expanding survivor’s pension benefits to same-sex couples); Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], agosto 20, 2008, Sentencia C-798/2008 (Colom.) (declaring the right to alimony
for members of a same-sex couple after it separates); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], enero 28, 2009, Sentencia C-029/2009 (Colom.) (declaring 26 different statutes constitutional
only if applied on equal terms to same-sex couples). These statutes covered the concept of “family,”
and “family group,” among others. For a detailed explanation of these decisions see Natalia Ramirez
and Daniel Bonilla, Universidad de Los Andes Public Interest Law Group, Colombia, 19 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 97, 97 (2011).
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CCC’s decision fell short of its own precedents at the very last moment.
The Court reasoned that same-sex couples were a family. It provided an
analysis that made same-sex couples and different-sex couples
indistinguishable from one another. The decision was moving towards one
and only one direction: marriage equality. At the last moment, however,
the Court chose to bypass its logical conclusion, choosing instead to fully
defer to the discretion of the Colombian Congress.
Interestingly, the Court established a deadline for the Colombian
Congress to act.141 If by June 20, 2013, Congress did not reach a statutory
solution, same-sex couples could go to a notary public “to formalize and
solemnize a contractual link that may allow them to constitute a family,
according to the scope that, by then, may be legally attributable to this type
of union.”142 With this sentence, the Court made its decision completely
circular. On the one hand, same-sex couples were like different-sex couples
with one difference—marriage. Congress had to treat same-sex couples and
different-sex couples equally, but it did not have to open marriage up to
same-sex couples. Congress’ failure to find a solution by June 20, 2013
would allow same-sex couples to become eligible to formalize their
relationships before a notary public. This formalization would have legal
effect, but in the absence of Congress’ action, there would be no law to
legally recognize such formalizations. The decision, therefore, would only
produce confusion if Congress did not comply with the Court’s mandate.
The June 20, 2013 deadline passed. Not only did the legislature not
pass a same-sex marriage statute, the Colombian Senate rejected a samesex marriage bill by a vote of fifty-one to seventeen.143 After a few weeks
of uncertainty, notaries began issuing legal marriage certificates to samesex couples and some judges began to solemnize same-sex marriages.144
However, other judges declared the same same-sex marriages performed by
these judges as null and void.145 The situation was again brought to the
141. Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11.
142. Id.
143. Eduardo Garcia & Carlos Vargas, Colombia lawmakers reject controversial gay marriage
bill, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-colombia-gaymarriageidUSBRE93N1DT20130424. The Colombian Congress is formed by the Senate and the Chamber of
Representatives. A bill has to be approved by both chambers in order to pass. Since the Senate rejected
the bill, the Chamber of Representatives never had the chance to discuss it.
144. See Kimberly Bennett, Colombia judge orders notary to perform same-sex marriage, JURIST,
(July 29, 2013), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/07/colombia-judge-orders-notary-to-perform-samesex-marriage.php (explaining how a Colombian appeals judge ordered a notary to perform a same-sex
marriage after refusing to do so).
145. Anulan segundo matrimonio entre parejas gay en Colombia, EL ESPECTADOR (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/anulan-segundo-matrimonio-entre-parejas-gaycolombia-articulo-453213.
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CCC under two constitutional claims presented by same-sex couples.146
Currently, it is unclear when the CCC will issue a decision that ends the
current legal confusion.147
c. Other examples of dignity and equality: Brazil, Portugal, and the
United States.
In 2011, the Federal Supreme Tribunal (STF), the highest court of
Brazil, granted same-sex couples the right to enter into permanent unions, a
right that heterosexual couples already enjoyed.148 This decision paved the
way for the National Justice Council of Brazil to prohibit Brazilian
authorities from refusing to perform same-sex marriages.149 The 2011 STF
decision was based on several grounds, including the right to equality.150
Namely, the Court concluded that all individuals must be treated with equal
respect.151 A different opinion in the same decision referred to dignity in a
way that implied a right to equality: “one is no more or less dignified by the
fact of having been born a man or a woman.”152 The decision, however,
placed a greater emphasis on dignity as linked to autonomy.153
Also in 2011, the Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal (TCP) decided if
legislation amending Portugal’s marriage statute to include same-sex
marriage was a constitutional violation.154 The court arrived at the
conclusion that its Constitution did not prohibit same-sex marriage and,
therefore, the legislature could amend the definition of marriage to include
same-sex couples.155 The Constitution of Portugal states that all

146. Corte Constitucional Revive Discusión sobre Matrimonio Gay, EL TIEMPO (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13528410.
147. Id.
148. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.).
149. Resolução No. 175, 14 de Maio de 2013, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Braz.).
150. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL
DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659 (Braz.).
151. Id.
152. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 14.
153. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux (“[A] Constituição de 1988 consagrou a família
como instrumento de proteção da dignidade dos seus integrantes e do livre exercício de seus direitos
fundamentais, de modo que, independentemente de sua formação—quantitativa ou qualitativa—serve o
instituto como meio de desenvolvimento e garantia da existência livre e autônoma dos seus membros.”
[“[T]he 1988 Constitution enshrined the family as a means of protecting the dignity of its members and
the free exercise of their fundamental rights, so that, regardless of its constitution—quantitative or
qualitative—the institute serves as a means of ensuring the guarantee of free and autonomous existence
of its members.”]).
154. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367
(Port.).
155. Id. ¶ 22.
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constitutional rights are based on the respect for human dignity.156 The
TCP decision, therefore, mentions dignity several times.157 It is not clear,
however, if the TCP is equating dignity with equality or autonomy.
Overall, however, it is clear that the decision was based on the right to
equality.158 Interestingly, the Spanish Constitutional Court took a similar
approach.159 Using a parallel framework, it reached a comparable decision
by relying mainly on the right to equality.160
In the United States, two decisions post-Windsor granted same-sex
marriage without entering into the institutional dignity argument provided
by Windsor.161 Neither decision argued that marriage is a societal need that
ought to be protected. The Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico decided these cases by focusing on the fact that
same-sex couples were deprived of tangible benefits that came with the
institution of marriage.162 This analysis is more apparent in Garden State
Equality v. Dow than in Griego because the New Jersey Civil Union Act
already granted all of the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples in civil unions except the label of “marriage.” The plaintiffs in
Garden State argued that after Windsor, civil union couples did not have
access to the federal benefits afforded to married couples.163 The New
Jersey Supreme Court could have followed Windsor and engaged with the
institutional dignity that comes with marriage. However, it did not talk
about the humiliation faced by children, or the role of marriage in
perfecting society. It only focused on the benefits same-sex couples were

156. See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [C.R.P.] [Constitution of the Portuguese
Republic] art. 1 (Por.) (“Portugal é uma República soberana, baseada na dignidade da pessoa humana e
na vontade popular e empenhada na construção de uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária.” [“Portugal is
a sovereign Republic based on the dignity of the human being and on the popular will and committed to
building a free, just and mutually supportive society.”]).
157. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010 ¶¶ 19, 22, 26.
158. See id. ¶ 25.
159. See generally S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 168) (Spain) (referencing the concept
of individual equality throughout the opinion).
160. See id. at 200 (holding there is nothing unconstitutional about the reforms to the Spanish Civil
Code which allowed marriage between partners of the same sex).
161. See generally Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 865 (N.M. 2013) (refraining from citing any
institutional dignity-based rationale for the court’s holding); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d
336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (refraining from citing any institutional dignity-based rationale for
the court’s holding).
162. See Griego, 316 P.3d at 874 (explaining numerous “hardships” on the family as a result of not
being able to marry); Garden State, 82 A.3d at 361 (“In the wake of the Windsor decision, plaintiffs
have shown that civil union partners in New Jersey are being denied equal access to federal benefits,
thus requiring that the right to marry be extended to same-sex couples under the equal protection
guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution.”).
163. Garden State, 82 A.3d at 342.
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deprived of by not having access to the label of “marriage,” and whether
this deprivation violated the court’s previous decision in Lewis v. Harris.164
In Griego, the Supreme Court of New Mexico determined that New
Mexico was constitutionally required to allow same-sex marriage.165 The
court’s equal protection analysis did not focus on institutional dignity or on
the need to protect marriage. It only focused on whether heterosexual and
“same-gender” couples were similarly situated and, therefore, whether they
should be afforded the same treatment.166 The decision did not focus on the
purpose of marriage, but on the purpose of New Mexico’s marriage laws.167
The court indicated that the purpose of these laws was “to bring stability
and order to the legal relationships of committed couples by defining their
rights and responsibilities to one another, their children if they choose to
raise children together, and their property.”168 It concluded that barring
same-gender couples from marrying based on their sexual orientation
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution.169
Both Garden State and Griego took a pragmatic approach towards
marriage. Both courts reasoned that as long as there were specific rights
and obligations derived from marriage, there should be equal access to the
institution that sets those rights and obligations.
2. The right to choose a family: the Mexican approach to dignity and
autonomy
Dignity attached to autonomy provides a solid ground for future
recognition of unmarried families. The Supreme Court of Mexico has
developed a strong case law on dignity as attached to autonomy and its
decisions on same-sex marriage reflect this approach. Other countries that
have based their same-sex marriage decisions on an idea of autonomy as
attached to dignity include Spain and Brazil. The cases analyzed below all
focus on the right of individuals to make decisions as long as other
constitutional rights are respected.
a. Mexico: dignity and individuality
In a 2008 decision, the Mexican Supreme Court (SCJN) elaborated on
the concept of dignity as linked to the free development of one’s

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See generally id. (referencing Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)).
Griego, 316 P.3d at 872.
Id. at 877–79.
See generally id. (analyzing New Mexico’s statute).
Id. at 872.
Id.
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individuality (libre desarrollo de la personalidad).170 This right includes,
among others, the freedom to choose freely and autonomously to marry, to
have children, and the right to sexual identity.171 The SCJN concluded,
therefore, that choosing to live with a person of the same or of a different
sex was also part of the free development of one’s individuality and
therefore one’s human dignity.172 In a previous case recognizing sexual
identity, the SCJN had already included a person’s sexuality within the
concept of dignity as autonomy by stating that:
[S]exuality is an essential component of a person’s life and her
psyche; it forms part of the most personal and intimate sphere of
human life. That is why sexual self-determination is transcendental
to the recognition of human dignity and its full development; and
that is why the constitutional protection includes a free decision
regarding sexuality.173

In 2010, the SCJN was confronted with the question of whether the
Mexican Constitution limited marriage to heterosexual couples.174 If that
were the case, the Federal District Congress would have overstepped its
authority by amending the definition of marriage established in Mexico’s
Civil Code to include couples of the same sex. That was the position of
Mexico’s Attorney General, who challenged the constitutionality of the
amendment.175 The Attorney General claimed that, although the Mexican
Constitution did not contain a definition of marriage, Article 4 of the
Constitution implies that marriage is an association that can only take place
between a man and a woman when it states that a foreign woman who
marries a Mexican man or a foreign man who marries a Mexican woman
can only become Mexican citizens by naturalization.176 The Constitution,
therefore, did not contemplate the option of a man marrying a man or a

170. Alejandro Madrazo & Estefania Vela, The Mexican Supreme Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?,
89 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1883–84 (2011) (citing Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de amparo directo civil 6/2008, Novena Época, 6 de enero de 2009,
slip op. 97 (Mex.)). The literal translation of “libre desarrollo de la personalidad” is “free development
of personality.” I have translated it, however, as “free development of one’s individuality” because I
think it better fits the meaning of this principle. Many countries include this principle (as principle or as
a right) within their constitutions. In this paper we see this principle in the Mexican and Spanish
decisions.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1883.
173. SCJN, Acción de amparo directo civil 6/2008.
174. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. (Mex.).
175. Id.
176. Id. (referring to the Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P] art.
30(B)(II) (Mex.)).
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woman marrying a woman.177
According to the Attorney General, this provision necessarily meant
that the Mexican Constitution limited marriage to heterosexual couples.178
Therefore, the only family protected by the Mexican Constitution was the
heterosexual, married family.179 Given that sexual orientation and identity
had already been declared part of human dignity by the SCJN in 2008, the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in 2010 would have to come
from a distinction that did not offend human dignity.180 As has been done
in other countries, the Attorney General looked to procreation for the
answer.181 This approach did not convince the SCJN, which disregarded
procreation as essential to marriage.182 Instead, the court focused on the
right to dignity as autonomy, in other words, the right to the free
development of one’s individuality.183 The court concluded that this right
included the right to choose to marry.184 If sexual orientation is included in
the concept of dignity, people consequently have the right to choose whom
to marry.185
The SCJN established a framework of dignity as related to the free
development of one’s individuality, and only after that did it analyze
constitutionality of same-sex marriage under an equality framework. Like
the South African Constitutional Court, the SCJN highlighted that the
Mexican Constitution prohibits any discrimination based on sex or any
other reason that may attack human dignity.186
b. Other uses of dignity and autonomy: Brazil and Spain
Brazil’s STF followed a similar rationale. The STF concluded that the
1988 Brazilian Constitution referred to the family as an instrument to
protect the dignity of family members and their freedom to enjoy

177. Id..
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
amparo directo civil 6/2008, Novena Época, 6 de enero de 2009, slip op. 97 (Mex.).
181. Transnationally procreation has been the most recurrent argument against same-sex marriage.
See e.g., SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 93–95; Conseil Constitutionneil [CC]
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669, May 17, 2013 ¶ 17 (Fr.); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
at 882; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003); Griego v. Oliver, 316
P.3d 865, 871 (N.M. 2013).
182. SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010.
183. Id. ¶ 263.
184. Id. ¶ 269.
185. Id. ¶ 265.
186. Id. at ¶ 315.
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fundamental rights.187 Accordingly, the family is not a unit that restricts
rights to adapt to other legal or even social obligations.188 On the contrary,
the family fosters the development and autonomy of its members.189
The idea of dignity was present in each of the opinions that form the
Court’s final decision. Dignity, the decision stated, is at the core of
individual autonomy.190 The right to dignity means the right of an
individual to choose how to live his life, and the creation of emotional
associations that have “legal dignity.”191 The Court also reasoned that
dignity is part of a core group of rights associated with autonomy:
“[g]uarantees of liberty of religion and secular state prevent religious moral
conceptions from guiding the state treatment of fundamental rights such as
the right to dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy or
the right to freedom of sexual orientation.”192
In 2012, Spain’s Constitutional Court also used the concept of dignity
as autonomy to declare the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage
statute passed by its Congress in 2005.193 The Court only referred to dignity
once, stating that the new statute did not affect marriage for heterosexual
individuals.194 For the Court, marriage was still the same institution; the
new statute gave individuals the new option of marrying persons of the
same sex.195 The Court reasoned that the statute respects “the guarantee of
dignity and free development of one’s individuality,” as mandated by
Article 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution.196
3. The role of reality in the creation of legal concepts: the social
family and the legal marriage
In addition to focusing on autonomy and equality, several decisions on
same-sex marriage refer to the need to recognize families, as they already
exist.197 None of these decisions provide a concept of what families are,
187. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.).
188. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 14 (Braz.).
189. Id.
190. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 15–16, 20, 26, 35.
191. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carmen Lucia, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 695 ¶ 8 (Braz.).
192. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, ¶ 7.
193. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 168, 180) (Spain).
194. Id. at 199.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Justice Ayres Brito stated that the Brazilian Constitution does not give a technical definition
of the family and it is concept open to reality. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 37. The
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but they do recognize the existence of social constructions of family
associations outside the limits imposed by legal systems.198 The highest
courts in Canada, Mexico, Portugal, and Brazil interpreted their
constitutional norms as adapting to new realities. The decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien also deserves recognition in this section
for interpreting equality as an evolving concept.199 The remainder of this
section shows how different courts view their legal institutions, including
their constitutional frameworks, as evolving in nature. These courts do not
only embrace a concept of marriage that can change, but more importantly,
they accept that the family as a legally protected unit changes in time, and
constitutional concepts evolve along with these institutions. The idea of an
evolving constitution is present in the discussions of the Canadian Supreme
Court, as well as Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, and some U.S. courts.
a. The constitution as an evolving instrument: Canada and the U.S.
states of Iowa and Connecticut
Canada’s courts have on several occasions analyzed the institution of
marriage.200 The ultimate decision on same-sex marriage came from the
Canadian Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage.201 This decision arose from a request by the Governor in
Council that the Court hear a reference on the legal amendment to the
concept of marriage as “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of
all others.”202 The Governor in Council posed several questions for the
Court to answer, including whether Parliament could modify the meaning
of marriage.203
The Court stated that Canada was a pluralistic society and one of the

Mexican Supreme Court stated that the Mexican Constitution protects the family as a social reality.
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010,
Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶ 235 (Mex.). The South African Constitutional Court
stated that “South Africa has a multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the only socially and legally
acceptable one.” Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶ 59 (S. Afr.).
198. Id.
199. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009) (“For sure, our nation has struggled
to achieve a broad national consensus on equal protection of the laws when it has been forced to apply
that principle to some of the institutions, traditions, and norms woven into the fabric of our society. This
observation is important today because it reveals equal protection can only be defined by the standards
of each generation.”).
200. See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] B.C.J. 994 (Can. B.C. C.A.); Halpern v. Canada,
[2003] O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Hendricks v. Québec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (Can. Que. C.S.).
201. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.).
202. Id. ¶ 1.
203. Id. ¶ 2.
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main pillars of Canada’s constitutional interpretation was the idea of the
Constitution as “a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation,
accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life.”204 The Court
explained how the idea of the Constitution as a living tree applies to the
concept of marriage by referring to other situations that were not originally
contemplated by the Constitution such as women’s participation in public
life, or Canada’s legislative competence over telephones through a power
established before telephones were invented.205
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision did not expand on the notion
of the family; instead, it was limited to answering the questions posed by
the Governor in Council. The decision, therefore, could be viewed as a
conformist one that refers only to the possibility of expanding marriage to
same-sex couples. However, arguably, the decision did more than just
expand marriage to same-sex couples. First, it affirmed that Canada’s
Constitution adapts to new social realities. Second, it rejected the idea of a
natural or supra-legal concept of marriage that can only be modified within
the limits of its own nature. The Canadian Court did not advance a
functionalist concept of marriage, nor did it link marriage to the protection
of the family. Nevertheless, the Court rejected heterosexuality as essential
or natural to marriage.206 Furthermore, it seems that the court’s
interpretation of marriage only recognized that marriage is composed of
two individuals as a natural aspect of the institution, and the free will of the
parties to enter into it.207 Underlying the Canadian Court’s decision is the
tenet that constitutional concepts evolve.
Canada’s decisions on same-sex marriage came after several legal
changes that minimized the difference between married and unmarried
couples.208 The role of family law in Canada had already started moving
towards recognition of families outside marriage and statutes ensured that
those relationships were legally protected. Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, therefore, should also be read in conjunction with Canada’s prior
decisions and regulations to understand the acceptance of functionalist

204. Id. ¶ 22.
205. See id. ¶¶ 22–23.
206. See id. ¶¶ 21–30.
207. See id. ¶ 27 (“The only objective core which the interveners before us agree is ‘natural’ to
marriage is that it is the voluntary union of two people to the exclusion of all others. Beyond this, views
diverge. We are faced with competing opinions on what the natural limits of marriage may be.”).
208. In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada held that for some purposes, the term “spouse” should
apply to long-term cohabitants. See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 421 (Can.). As early as 1999,
Canada’s Supreme Court recognized the property rights of same-sex partners after dissolution. See M.
v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, ¶¶ 1–6 (Can.).
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approaches towards families within Canada’s legal system.209
Two cases in the U.S. also show a possible shift towards an evolution
in constitutional interpretation. The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in
Varnum v. Brien,210 and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health demonstrate the use of a living
constitution approach towards same-sex marriage.211
Varnum could be viewed as reinforcing the marriage paradigm.212
Like the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goodridge, the Iowa Supreme
Court emphasized the good qualities of the plaintiffs to highlight their
similarities with opposite-sex couples.213 The only difference between the
plaintiffs and most Iowans, the court reasoned, was that they were
“sexually and romantically attracted to members of their own sex.”214 The
issue for the court was, therefore, to decide if same-sex couples were
similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with regard to marriage.215 The
court decided that restricting marriage to same-sex couples was a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.216 The decision
referred to marriage as a framework that provides stability: “[s]ociety
benefits, for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable framework
within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and
end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is
provided for opposite-sex couples.”217
Varnum accepted marriage as a beneficial institution for society.
However, it did so based on practical terms more than on an idealistic view
of marriage. The court did not say anything about marriage making
individuals better, or marriage giving a special dignity to the parties. More
importantly, along with its analysis on marriage, the court affirmed that
constitutional interpretations evolve. Citing a prior decision, it stated that
Iowa’s “constitution is not merely tied to tradition, but recognizes the
changing nature of society.”218
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan also acknowledged the

209. See Joanna Radbord, Lesbian Love Stories: How We Won Equal Marriage in Canada, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 102–03 (2005).
210. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 862 (Iowa 2009).
211. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407 (Conn. 2008).
212. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 883.
216. Id. at 906.
217. Id. at 883.
218. Id. at 876 (quoting Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999)).
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possibility of more realistic conceptions of the family in the future. The
court recognized that constitutional norms must be interpreted according to
the context in which they are being applied:
In short, the [State] constitution was not intended to be a static
document incapable of coping with changing times. It was meant to
be, and is, a living document with current effectiveness . . . . The
Connecticut constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended
to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too
narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary
effectiveness for all of our citizens.219

Both courts begin their analyses by accepting the possibility that legal
and constitutional concepts evolve as society evolves.
b. The family as a social construct: Mexico, Brazil, and Portugal
In Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, the SCJN had the task of
interpreting the Mexican Constitution either in line with the Attorney
General’s constitutional claim limiting the definition of family to the
married family, or advancing a different position.220 The SCJN chose the
latter and in doing so, it chose a transformative analysis of the role of
family law over a conformist approach to legal regulations based on a
narrow concept of marriage. The Court based its decision not on how
important marriage was for the Mexican people, but on a constitutional
interpretation of the family that declined to privilege one type of family
over others.221
According to this, the role of the Constitution with regard to the
family is not to encourage people to fit into one particular model of family,
which is the result if only married families enjoy constitutional protection,
or if married families are afforded more legal benefits and rights than
unmarried ones. The Constitution assumes, therefore, the role of protector
of families that may or may not be desired by the democratic majority. The
reasoning is that as long as these families exist in Mexico, and if they are
based on the principle of equality between men and women, they should be
recognized as constitutionally protected.222
219. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421 (Conn. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 19 (Conn. 1988)).
220. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶ 13 (Mex.).
221. See id. ¶ 235.
222. Even before analyzing the institution of the family, the court analyzes the principle of equality
between men and women. See id. ¶ 233. Challenging polygamy as a constitutionally protected family
unit on the basis of violating equality between men and women is beyond the extent of this paper.
Under some constitutional schemes, however, it may be possible to advance a substantive equality
argument that looks at actual polygamous social constructions and rejects them as structurally
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The SCJN also analyzed the social relevance of marriage, and
ultimately concluded that it was also a mutable concept that needed to
adapt to social realities.223 The SCJN, therefore, is another high court that
sees the law adapting to social needs rather than demanding that society
adapt to a normative idea of the family. The Court confirmed this when it
stated:
Social reality demands an answer from the legislature . . . it is an
undeniable fact that society and even marriage’s secularization and
the transformation of human relations have gradually led to
different forms of emotional, sexual, and mutually supportive
relationships. At the same time, they have led to legal changes with
regard to the institution of marriage, which has resulted in the
redefinition of the traditional concept [of marriage] used during
different periods of time . . . .224

The Mexican decision began with an explanation of the role of the
constitution as protecting families instead of mandating that people
conform to a specific model of family.225 The Court then went on to
explain that it was also incorrect to believe that the Mexican Constitution
would only allow people to marry individuals of a different sex.226 On the
contrary, the Court, like the South African Constitutional Court and the
Canadian Supreme Court, considered that its own Constitution had to adapt
to social changes.227 It analyzed marriage as an institution that could no
longer be connected to procreation and, therefore, marriage could not be
limited to heterosexual couples on the basis of that feature.228
In a later decision, the SCJN had the opportunity to test its decision on
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in a case that challenged the
traditional concept of marriage in the Mexican state of Oaxaca’s Civil
Code.229 The SCJN not only reaffirmed its prior case law, but went further,
stating that sexual orientation, as a suspect category, was subject to strict
scrutiny.230 As such, Oaxaca needed to demonstrate that a measure limiting

discriminating against women and unacceptable in a secular system.
223. Id. ¶ 242.
224. Id.
225. See id. ¶ 235.
226. See id. ¶ 250.
227. See id. ¶ 254.
228. Id. ¶¶ 249, 250, 270.
229. Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012 (Mex.).
230. Mexico’s Supreme Court uses two different standards of review: ordinary scrutiny and strict
scrutiny. The ordinary scrutiny “applies to issues that do not directly affect human rights and have a
broad margin of action and appreciation for the authority from a normative perspective such as on
financial and economic matters.” Id. In contrast, strict scrutiny is used when the Court considers that
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constitutional rights based on sexual orientation responded to a
constitutionally imperative objective.231 The measure also had to relate
directly to the State’s objective.232 The SCJN found that the regulation of
marriage by the State of Oaxaca was aimed at protecting the family and
concluded that this was an imperative objective.233 However, because the
Mexican Constitution does not just protect the traditional family,
comprised of a married father, mother, and their respective biological
children, the Court did not consider the measure to be directly linked to the
objective.234 Instead, the Constitution protects the family as understood by
“social reality.”235 The SCJN is another example of a high court that has
chosen not to focus on the right to marry, but on the right to a family.
The same approach was adopted by Brazil’s STF and Portugal’s TCP.
In addition to a narrative on autonomy and equality, several of the opinions
that formed the STF’s decision spoke specifically about the need to
recognize reality as the foundation for legal constructions, rather than the
traditional ideal of a married family.236 Just like the Mexican decisions, the
Brazilian opinions also conceptualized the family as a unit of mutual
support.237 The major contribution of the 2011 Brazilian STF decision was
there is a fundamental right at risk, for example, the right to equality and non-discrimination under
Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution. See Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 202/2013, Décima Época, 26 de junio de 2013, 10
(Mex.). In the Oaxaca decision on same-sex marriage, the Court stated that heightened scrutiny was
necessary because the law distinguished who could marry “based on the sexual preferences of
individuals,” which is a suspect category. Id. The Court explained that a suspect category is implicated
when a law “affects one of the criteria mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 1, [such as] . . . ethnic
origin, nationality, gender, age, disability, social condition, health, religion, opinions, sexual
preferences, marital status ‘or any other quality that may threaten human dignity and may have as an
objective to destroy or undermine the rights and liberties of individuals.’” Id. For the Court, heightened
scrutiny requires clear constitutional support: “[the statute] must pursue a constitutionally important
objective.” Id. In addition, strict scrutiny requires that the challenged measure be directly connected to
those constitutional objectives and be the least restrictive measure to effectively achieve that objective.
SCJN, Amparo en Revisión 581/2012, at 33–34.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 35.
233. Id. at 36.
234. Id. at 37.
235. Id.
236. Justice Luis Fux stated in his decision that “homosexuals create continuous and lasting
relationships of love and mutual support to share means and life projects. This simply happens, as it has
always happened (though in many cases secretively), and for sure it will continue happening.” S.T.F.,
No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA
[R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659 ¶ 9 (Braz.). Justice Ayres Brito stated that the concept of family in the
Brazilian Constitution has no orthodox meaning, but that is should have some basis in reality. S.T.F.,
No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Brito, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA
[R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 625 ¶ 37 (Braz.).
237. Id. ¶ 12.
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the equalization of married and unmarried families. By recognizing that
there was no constitutional difference between the married and the
unmarried family, the decision made marriage a real option, ensuring that
any rights provided to married couples would also have to be granted to
unmarried families in the future.238 The STF left the door wide open for the
recognition of family units beyond the divide between same-sex and
different-sex couple when it stated that the family was a cultural
construction that evolves with time.239 The opinion criticized the
patriarchal family unit and gave a historical account of the unit’s evolution
towards an egalitarian concept of the family.240
Portugal’s TCP used similar reasoning to justify the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage. The TCP argued that the Portuguese Constitution
uses open concepts that allow the legislature to maintain a connection
between legislation and social reality.241 The Constitution, the Court
stated, enshrines a flexible concept of marriage that allows the inclusion of
different social, political, and ethical convictions in different historical
moments.242
The decisions analyzed above leave the door open for couples to keep
pushing for greater legal protection and recognition of non-traditional
families beyond what has already been advanced.
II. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
The increased litigation over same-sex marriage gives societies an
opportunity to review the reasons behind the divide between married and
unmarried families. Marriage, undoubtedly, serves some purposes. It is a
bundle of rights, benefits, and obligations that are allocated ex ante. The
question, however, is if there are any legitimate reasons to keep treating
this bundle as a privileged institution instead of a pre-packed family
association option that does not guarantee privileged treatment over other
family associations. A brief analysis of the purposes that marriage has
served in the past, and the purposes it continues to serve today,
demonstrates that when societies create a special status for the married
family, they nevertheless fail to protect most real families.
Marriage has served several purposes in the Western legal tradition.
238. Id. ¶ 44.
239. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 8 (Braz.).
240. Id. at ¶ 9.
241. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367,
22377 (Port.).
242. Id.
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For centuries, marriage was an essential part of the economic machinery, as
a means of transferring and controlling property.243 Historically, children
and wives were able workers with economic value per se, making them
valuable to the production of wealth.244 Until recently, the control of
women’s sexuality through marriage was also essential to ensure legal
paternity.245 Marriage also played an important role in the continuation of
the patriarchal family. Historically, this meant that men were the heads of
households and owners of everything inside their dwellings, from material
goods, to slaves, servants, children, and wives.246 Lastly, because societies
were structured on systems of class and race, marriage helped perpetuate
racial and class homogeny. In many Western countries these objectives
were in place even beyond the 1960s.247 In all times and places, however,
families have formed outside the marriage realm, but legal systems have
failed to acknowledge them.
A. New reality
Today, the public narrative regarding family law and marriage in
particular, has changed. Few actors would be willing to argue openly that
marriage still has the social purpose of securing men’s sexual monopoly
over women and consequently securing legitimate offspring. Adultery is

243. LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 1601-1740: THE ADOPTION OF THE STRICT
SETTLEMENT 93 (1983); STPEHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY
OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 45 (2005).
244. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 190 (2010).
245. See CHRISTINA SIMMONS, MAKING MARRIAGE MODERN: WOMEN’S SEXUALITY FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO WORLD WAR II 6 (2009).
246. The patriarchal family is common to most legal cultures regardless of historical periods. Until
today we see its vestiges in different countries. The Roman family, inherited by countries of the
continental legal tradition, was led by a pater familias, owner of everything within his household, and
with power over his children until his death. BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK
ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 4–5 (Joel Lidov ed., 2004). In France, the wife owed obedience to the husband
and the husband owed protection to the wife. The wife had an obligation to live with and follow her
husband to wherever he decided to live. The wife could not trade or contract on her own. See CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 213–15 (1804) (Fr.), reproduced at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1061517/
f55.image. Sir William Blackstone went even further in regulating the authority of the husband over his
wife: “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is
therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert, femina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron, or
under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
¶ 442–445 (Wayne Morrison ed., vol. 1, 1765).
247. Although many states had already amended their statutes, a general band on interracial
marriage only came in 1967 with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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scantly penalized and, when it is, rarely legally enforced in the Western
world.248 Children may still be legally classified as legitimate or
illegitimate, but DNA tests offer far better proof of paternity than
marriage.249 Arguing that marriage complies with a community’s interest
in keeping races pure or social classes unmixed would also be virtually
unthinkable in the modern era. Racial discrimination is blatantly
unconstitutional in most Western countries, and constitutes a recognized
violation of international human rights law.250
Property allocation and economic stability are the only remaining
justifications for marriage. Before the massive entrance of women into
labor markets, a woman’s main source of income was her marriage.251
Women can now, of course, acquire property on their own. Property
allocation is thus no longer an objective of marriage but a consequence that
flows from the existence of the institution. Economic gains are likely a
prime motivator for many people to marry, but Western legal systems tend
to reject profit as a valid reason for marriage.252 Marriage serves as a force
in the allocation of responsibilities for the welfare of individuals. A
marriage certificate formally compels two individuals to care for one
another, attempting to avoid or at least to delay the need for the
government to provide basic care for those individuals.253 Public policies
reinforcing or promoting marriage have been justified on reducing welfare

248. THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN IN WORLD HISTORY VOL. I, ADULTERY:
COMPARATIVE HISTORY 29 (Bonnie G. Smith ed., 2008). For adultery in the United States, see Kyle
Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 359, 406–07 (2008).
249. See LINDA A. MOONEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 164 (2007).
250. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) art.
1, 2, 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, 24, Nov. 22. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights]; European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].
251. Prior to 1920s most women exited the work force at marriage. It was not until the 1950s that
married women start participating in the work force almost in the same proportion as unmarried
women. Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education,
and Family, 96 THE AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1, 2–5 (2006).
252. This is evident when comparing legal reasons for marriage annulment. An error in the
economic conditions of one of the parties, even in the case of open deception from one party to the
other, has rarely been accepted as grounds for annulment. The original Napoleonic Code included
several articles regulating marriage annulment but none referred to a mistake in the economic
conditions of one of the parties. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] tit. V, ch. IV (1804) (Fr.). Today’s French
Civil Code also regulates marriage annulment in similar terms in Articles 180 to 202. See CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.] art. 213–15 (Fr.).
253. Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 3, 4 (2010).
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responsibilities.254 It is not, however, legal marriage that reduces welfare,
but rather economic and social stability.255 It is not the marriage license
that magically stops people from falling into poverty.
In the Western world, legal marriage in the twenty-first century is, for
the most part, an individual choice. Western countries view arranged
marriages as a violation of human rights.256 Communities largely define
themselves through each member’s individuality.257 Communal respect for
an individual’s autonomy has increased, and alongside it the concept of
marriage has shifted from an institution for the realization of moral duties
to one of privacy and freedom.258
More educational and labor opportunities have also created a notable
increase in autonomy for women.259 By the end of the twentieth-century,
men and women were shaping family structures that were increasingly
more detached from traditional precepts and external controls.260 The
development of the right to privacy and the concept of individual rights
have also contributed to three significant changes in family structure: 1)

254. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (“The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of
States in operating a program designed to—(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children
may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing
and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of
two-parent families.”)
255. Judith Stacey, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples: The Impact on Children and
Families, 23 QLR 529, 534 (2004) (“[t]here is considerable consensus among researchers that a
disproportionate cause of the greater risks suffered by children in single-parent families derives from
the lesser economic and educational resources that one adult, as compared to two, can normally offer a
child.”); see also, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES, FAMILIES INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW
128 (2005). As Friedman states, in Finland and Scandinavian countries, children are commonly born
out of wedlock because their parents choose not to marry. Id. They, however, are not worse off than
children born within a legal marriage under the same socio economic circumstances. Id. (“To children
in a stable, loving household, it can hardly make much difference whether Mother and Father have a
marriage license and went through a ceremony or not.”)
256. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 16(1)–(2); American Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 250, arts. 2, 17.1; European Human Rights Conventions, supra note 150,
art. 12.
257. See Population Div. of Dep’t. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, Partnership and
Reproductive Behaviour in Low-Fertility Countries, 6, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.177 (May 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/reprobehavior/partrepro.pdf [hereinafter
Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour].
258. “Where mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public spokesmen had hardly been able to
speak of marriage without mentioning Christian morality, mid-twentieth-century discourse saw the
hallmarks of the institution in liberty and privacy, consent and freedom.” NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 197 (2002).
259. Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour, supra note 257, at 5.
260. Id.
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more children born out of wedlock, 2) more heterosexual cohabitation
outside marriage, and 3) increased visibility of same-sex couples.
1. Marriage and children
Since the 1960s, the Western world has experienced a marked increase
in children born out of wedlock.261 According to statistics gathered by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2009, 41% of births in
the United States were to unmarried women.262 There has been a slight
decrease since then to 40.7% of births to unmarried women in 2012.263
These figures are more than twice the number found in 1980.264 Most
developed countries are experiencing comparable trends, with countries
such as Iceland, Sweden, and Norway having more than 50% of births out
of wedlock.265 Most European countries are experiencing the same
phenomenon.266
A similar trend exists among Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries, with more than 50% of children born
out of wedlock in France, Mexico, Slovenia, and the Nordic countries.267
Even where the proportion of children born outside marriage is low, this
percentage still represents an increase over prior decades.268 South America
shares similar statistics. The percentage of births out of wedlock in Chile
went from less than 16% in the 1960s to over 50% in the early twenty-first
century.269 The entire Latin American region has experienced a significant
decline in the number of births within marriage.270 In 1970, around 75% of
all children in Latin America were born within a married family.271 By the

261. Id. at 44.
262. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., DIV. OF VITAL STATISTICS, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2012 9
(2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_09.pdf.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. DIRECTORATE OF EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FAMILY DATABASE: SHARE OF BIRTHS OUT OF
WEDLOCK AND TEENAGE BIRTHS 1, available at www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database (last updated
Feb. 24, 2012).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Ximena Valdés, Notas sobre la Metamorfosis de la Familia en Chile, Meeting of ECLAC and
UNFPA experts, (Nov. 22–23, 2007) available at http://www.eclac.cl/dds/noticias/paginas/9/30289/
Resumen.XimenaValdes.pdf.
270. Ximena Castro Martin et al., Maternidad sin Matrimonio en América Latina: Análisis
Comparativo a Partir de Datos Censales, CEPAL NOTAS DE POBLACIÓN NO. 93, 48 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/9/45549/lcg2509-P_2.pdf.
271. Id.
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beginning of the twenty-first century, however, more than 50% of children
were born out of wedlock.272
Historically, illegitimate children were not only social outcasts,273 but
also legal outcasts.274 As the social stigma of having a child out of wedlock
has faded, the legal treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children has
balanced out to almost total equality.275 Marriage has thus become much
less of a need and much more of a choice, at least when it comes to
protecting children from legal disadvantages.
2. Marriage and cohabitation
Statistics on children born out of wedlock mirror a steady increase in
the number of unmarried couples living together. In the United States, the
number of unmarried couples living together increased from 1.6 million in
1980 to 4.1 million in 1997.276 In recent years marriage has continued to
decline steadily with a 5% decrease in the number of married couples from

272. Id.
273. Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOC. 215, 215 (1934) (“[t]he
bastard, like the prostitute, thief and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd of disreputable social types
which society has generally resented, always endured. He is a living symbol of social irregularity, an
undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in short, a problem—a problem as old and unsolved as
human existence itself.”).
274. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 24 (1996).
275. The treatment of illegitimate children varies from country to country. The Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which has 194 States Parties, establishes in Article 2.2 that “States Parties shall
take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status . . . of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.”
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2.2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added). In
several cases the European Court of Human Rights has decided that the differentiation between
legitimate and illegitimate children is a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. See
Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987);
Mazurek v. France, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 (2006); Camp and Bourimi v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 117
(2000); Brauer v. Germany, App. No. 3545/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (2009), Fabris v. France, App.
No. 16574/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). Article 17.5 of the American Convention of Human Rights states
that “[t]he law shall recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those born in
wedlock.” American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 17.5. Children in the United
States born out of wedlock are subject to less stigma today, but they still experience some differences
vis a vis children born within a legal marriage. As Richard Storrow points out, children born out of
wedlock still “face legal obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.” See Richard F. Storrow, The
Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561, 577 (2012). For a detailed account on the differences between these
children in the areas of inheritance, government benefits, and torts, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, The
New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 437, 465 (2012).
276. Table 66, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (118 ed. 1998), cited in D. A.
Habbegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent upon Sexual
Orientation?, 33 IN. L. REV. 991, 991 (2000).
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2009 to 2010.277 This is a trend outside the United States as well.278 In the
last third of the twentieth century, cohabitation became popular among
young professionals in Northern and Western Europe.279 In Latin America,
cohabitation has increased and formal unions have decreased, especially
among young couples.280 In Panama, Chile, and Mexico, the percentage of
unwed cohabiting couples increased between 1985 and 2000, particularly
amongst individuals between the ages of twenty-five and forty years old.281
This trend cannot be interpreted as a total rejection of marriage, since
numbers do not show if cohabitation is seen as a premarital arrangement or
as an alternative to marriage.282 Both possibilities, however, have far
reaching consequences for the relationship between marriage and family
formation. They show that marriage has lost its relevance as the primary
gateway for starting a family. Men and women have children and engage
in committed relationships without linking those decisions to marriage.
This demographic reality coincides with a more open attitude towards
cohabitation in general.283
3. Same-sex couples
Until the mid-twentieth century, legal and political struggles in favor
of gay and lesbian rights focused primarily on protecting individuals from
homophobia and repealing sodomy laws.284 In the United States in 1960,
every state had statutes criminalizing various types of consensual sexual
relations between individuals of the same sex.285 Although there are cases

277. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1 (2011),
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-arecord-low/.
278. K. Kiernan, The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe,
15 INT’L J. L., POL’Y. & THE FAM. 1, 1 (2001); see also A.H. GAUTHIER, THE STATE AND THE FAMILY:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY POLICIES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 111-112 (1998).
279. Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour, supra note 257, at 23.
280. Jorge Rodriguez Vignoli, Tendencias recientes de las Uniones Consensuales en América
Latina: Un Examen con Distinciones Socioeconómicas en Países Seleccionados, CEPAL MEETING OF
EXPERTS, 6 (Oct. 28–29 2004), available at http://www.eclac.org/dds/noticias/paginas/9/19679/
JRodriguez.pdf.
281. Id. at 5.
282. Id. at 7.
283. In response to a recent study, 39% of American answered that they believed marriage is an
obsolete institution. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND THE RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES: A SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS REPORT (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf.
284. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV.
1558 (1993).
285. Mary Bernstein, Liberalism and Social Movement success: the case of United States Sodomy
Statutes, in REGULATING SEX: THE POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 3, 3 (Elizabeth Bernstein &
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of legal battles for the recognition of same-sex marriage prior to the
1990s,286 the rise in the visibility of gay and lesbian couples is mainly a
phenomenon of the 1990s.287 In 2001, The Netherlands was the first
country to legalize same-sex marriage.288 However, the movement towards
recognition of same-sex couples as legitimate associations began much
earlier.289 Most regulations aimed at providing comprehensive legal
frameworks for same-sex couples in Europe emerged in the 1980s and
1990s.290 Denmark was the first country to pass a registered partnership
regime for same-sex couples.291 The statute resembled marriage regulation
in all aspects related to the relationship between the couple, but left out all
parental regulations.292 Other countries that legally recognized same-sex
couples followed this pattern.293 Since 1989, an increasing number of
countries have created some type of regulation that recognizes the

Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005).
286. CAROL SANGER, FAMILY LAW STORIES, 28–30 (2007).
287. This is apparent by the rise in the number of publications discussing same-sex marriage or
same-sex unions in general. A limited search in the Library of Congress catalog shows thirteen books
with the word “same-sex marriage” in the title between 1900 and 1989, forty-two between 1990 and
1999, and 450 since the year 2000. An advanced search of the Worldcat database
(http://www.worldcat.org/) showed five entries between 1900 and 1989 that contain “same-sex” in the
title, and the word “marriage” as a subject when searching for books in English, excluding juvenile and
fiction categories. The same search showed 160 hits from 1990 to 2000, and 974 from 2001 to 2013.
When narrowing the search by limiting results by subject heading and marking only “same-sex
marriage,” Worldcat shows 96 entries from 1990 to 2000, and 521 from 2001 to 2013. It does not show
“same-sex marriage” as a search-limiting option when looking between 1900 and 1989.
288. Ian Curry-Sumner, A Patchwork of Partnerships: Comparative Overview of Registration
Schemes in Europe, in LEGAL RECOGNITIONS OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE, NATIONAL
CROSS-BORDER AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, EUROPEAN FAMILY Law Series No. 32 71 (Katharina
Boele-Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds., 2012); see also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.
2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013) (stating that with the legalization of same-sex marriage in Iowa, the
presumption of legitimacy applies regardless of the gender of the spouses).
289. Katharina Boele-Woelki, Colloquy, Le Partenariat Enregistre: Legislation Des Pays-Bas 44
(1999), available at http://ciec1.org/CadrEtudeColloque.htm.
290. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001)
291. Macarena Sáez, Same Sex Marriage, Same Sex Cohabitation and Same Sex Families Around
The World: Why “Same” Is So Different. 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 16 (2011).
292. Linda Nielsen, Family Rights and the “Registered Partnership” in Denmark, 4(3) INT’L J. L.
POL’Y FAM. 297, 298 (1990).
293. In 2003, Belgium first passed a same-sex marriage law with restrictions on adoption. Only in
2005 did the legislature open adoption to same-sex couples. Frederik Swennen & Yves-Henri Leleu,
Belgium, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 57, 65 (2011). Portugal did the same in 2010 by
expanding marriage to same-sex couple but keeping adoption open only to heterosexual couples. Sáez,
supra note 291 at 9–10. In May 2013, Portugal granted same-sex married couples access to second
parent adoption. Andrei Khalip, Gay Couples in Portugal win limited adoption rights, REUTERS (May
17, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-portugal-gayadoption-idUSBRE
94G0KV20130517.

22_SAEZ_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

174

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/15/2015 3:18 PM

[Vol 25:125

legitimacy of same-sex couples.294
These new legal landscapes have triggered developments in
international law, immigration law, family law, and tax law, among other
areas. Countries face new legal issues related to the recognition of civil
unions and same-sex marriage. For example, old principles, such as the
presumption of the legitimacy of children within marriage, have to be
reinterpreted in light of same-sex marriage.295 Civil unions and registered
partnerships create a set of legal family associations that did not exist
before the 1980s. New associations are accompanied by new legal issues,
and countries have been adapting ever since to a more complex set of
familial alternatives.
Today, the traditional legal concept of marriage is contrasted with a
reality that is more diverse, and includes families that are formed by adults
and children who often are not tied to each other by blood or marriage.
Individuals no longer see marriage as a mandatory step before forming a
family, and look at marriage as one of several private alternatives. Since
the inception of no-fault divorce in many countries, marriage looks more
like a private contract and has less of a public institutional character.296
Countries have also detached the concept of parenthood from marriage,
recognizing parenthood as a direct link between child and parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parents.297 The struggle for the
recognition of same-sex couples has brought into view the longstanding
issue of the lack of recognition of complex family structures outside
marriage.

294. According to the organization Hiddush-Freedom of Religion for Israel, at least thirty-four
states have provided foundational approval to same-sex couples. See Freedom of Marriage World Map,
HIDDUSH FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://marriage.hiddush.org/about/
same-sex-marriage-and-civil-unions. According to the Pew Research Center, by the end of 2014, twenty
countries allowed same-sex marriage either fully or partially. Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/12/19/gay-marriage-around-theworld-2013/.
295. Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and
Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 575–76
(2004). Originally, the Dutch legislature did not want to apply the presumption of legitimacy to samesex marriage. It stated that “[i]t would be pushing things too far to assume that a child born in a
marriage of two women would legally descend from both women. That would be stretching reality.”
Kees Waaldijk, Explanatory memorandum on the text of the Dutch law on the opening up of marriage
for same-sex partners (May 2, 2001), available at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Translation%20
of%20Dutch%20law%20on%20same-sex%20marriage.pdf.
296. JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 72 (2002).
297. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW
xiii (2000).
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B. An old legal framework
While the social concept of marriage has changed, most countries
employ marriage as the fundamental paradigm of family law. In many
systems, marriage and the family are still constitutionally equated with one
another. For example, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
states in its first chapter, entitled “Basic Rights,” that “[m]arriage and the
family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.”298 Australia does not
enumerate a list of rights in its Constitution. Nevertheless, its Constitution
states that Parliament shall have the power to “make laws for the peace,
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: . . .
(xxi) marriage; (xxii) divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation
thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.”299
In Hungary, the Constitution includes within its General Provisions of
Chapter I the protection of the “institution of marriage and the family.”300
Colombia connects both institutions by stating that “[t]he family is the
basic nucleus of society. It is formed on the basis of natural or legal ties,
by the free decision of a man and woman to contract matrimony or by their
responsible will to conform one.”301 Furthermore, Article 42 of the
Colombian Constitution has ten paragraphs dedicated to the regulation of
marriage and family.302
Meanwhile, in Peru, the Constitution states that it protects the family
and “promotes marriage” as recognition that marriage and family are
“natural and fundamental institutions of society.”303 Similarly, El
Salvador’s Constitution states that “[m]arriage is the legal foundation of the
family,” and goes on to say that “[t]he State will encourage marriage.”304 It
does, nonetheless, add that “[t]he lack of [marriage] will not affect the
enjoyment of rights that may be established in favor of the family.”305 A
similar connection is found in the Constitutions of other Latin American
countries such as Brazil,306 Costa Rica,307 Cuba,308 Guatemala,309
298. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VI (Ger.).
299. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51.
300. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY]
art. 15.
301. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art.42.
302. Id.
303. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF PERU] art. 4.
304. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL SALVADOR [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR] art. 32.
305. Id.
306. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 226 (Braz.)
307. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COSTA RICA [C.P.] [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA]
art. 51.
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Honduras,310 Panama,311 and the Dominican Republic.312 All these
protections, however, look small when compared to Ireland’s constitution.
In Article 41.3.1, Ireland pledges “to guard with special care the institution
of marriage, on which the family is founded, and to protect it against
attack.”313 It goes on to constitutionalize the role of women in the family
by considering their role at home as instrumental to the common good and
ensuring that mothers do not have to work for economic reasons “to the
neglect of their duties in the home.”314
In the same vein, international human rights instruments refer to
marriage and family as naturally connected. Article 16 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights refers to the right to marry, and immediately
after states, “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”315 The
European Convention on Human Rights also makes the connection
between family and marriage by stating, “[m]en and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according
to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”316 The American
Convention on Human Rights follows the same trend by recognizing under
the “Rights of the Family” that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society” and “[t]he right of men and women of marriageable
age to marry and to raise a family.”317
There is, therefore, a disconnection between the strict regulation of
marriage, that is, the legal meaning of marriage, and the reality of family
formation. On the one hand, family law is based on a rigid structure of
formal ties where marriage occupies the privileged position of the most
complete relationship. A man and a woman linked by marriage enjoy
protections and rights that couples linked by ties other than marriage do not
have access to. More importantly, marriage changes the nature of a
relationship from an association of two individuals to a complex web of

308. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE CUBA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF CUBA] art. 35.
309. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE GUATEMALA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF GUATEMALA] art. 47.
310. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF
HONDURAS] art. 111.
311. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF PANAMA]
art. 52.
312. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC] art. 55.
313. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 41(3)(1).
314. Id. art. 41(2)(1)–(2).
315. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 16(3).
316. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 250, art. 12.
317. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 17(1)–(2).
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family relationships. It creates diversity of kinship as no other association
does. On the other hand, real families do not necessarily fit the options
provided by family law. Real families are formed by dynamic movements
of individuals coming and going, creating support networks that do not
correspond to ties by blood or sex. Real families are linked by dependency
and support, and legal families are linked by law, regardless of whether
there is real dependency or real support. There is a divide between the
families that societies aspire to have, and the families that actually form
within those societies.318
This distinction refers to the dichotomy between the legal creation of
an ideal family that reflects a specific society, and the families that actually
exist in our communities.319 The legal family is a hierarchical, heterosexual,
patriarchal, and formalistic unit that starts with marriage. Family law based
on this paradigm regulates how to start a family, what to do within the
family, and how to exit the family. Instead, reality shows the complexities
of relationships aimed at caring for and supporting individuals, which
sometimes coincides with marital relations, and at many other times
develops outside of the realm of marriage or even sex. Legal systems,
however, are still focused on constructing families through marriage and
offering these families a beneficial legal framework. Thus, real families
outside marriage are treated as anomalies that ought to be regulated only to
the extent necessary to avoid unfairness. A good example of a regulation
based on fairness is found in the decision on de facto unions issued by the
Family Court of Costa Rica in 2004.320 In its opinion, the court states “[i]t
is interesting to note that the topic of de facto unions has been a whole
process [sic] in which statistics that reflect reality within our social fabric
demonstrate a disconnect with our legal regulations, and in order to avoid
injustices, some situations have been, little by little, recognized and
protected.”321
Marriage, instead, is regulated as an aspirational social institution; a
valuable institution that brings something that nothing else brings to
society. Marriage is treated as an essential component in the construction
of the polis. From this perspective, marriage is not only a family law
institution, but also a civic institution. A citizen fulfills his civic duties not
only by participating in public life, but by marrying another person and
having children who will also become good citizens, and who in turn

318.
319.
320.
321.

See ALISON DIDUCK, LAW’S FAMILIES, 21–30 (2003).
See id.
T. Familia, junio 24, 2004, Sentencia 1040/04 (Costa Rica).
Id. ¶ III.
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should marry. Marriage, thus, is viewed as a good in itself, regardless of
any material benefits it may bring. The argument for marriage as an
essentially “good” institution has permeated most of the struggle to keep
marriage a heterosexual privileged institution.322
Cohabitation outside marriage has been to the family what illegal
immigration has been to the state. In different periods, countries have been
forced to redefine citizenship or to include as citizens individuals who were
originally not welcomed as such.323 The same has happened with families.
Countries have been forced by reality to recognize individuals who were
once unwelcome in the legal family structure as family members. With the
rise of cohabitation, the stigma of illegitimacy faded away and claims for
equality between children born in and out of wedlock became more
common.324 By abolishing the distinction between children born in
marriage and out of wedlock, states recognized direct family ties between
parent and child without marriage as the intermediary.325
Every time a court has granted rights to unmarried couples based on
performing the same functions as married couples, they have recognized
that family ties are possible beyond what formal statutes have intended.
Courts approach this recognition as based on a need for fairness. For
example, in cases for infliction of emotional distress, some courts have
refused to use marriage as a bright line to reject complaints for
negligence.326
322. See id. ¶ II.A.
323. This is apparent in the United States with the discussion on immigration reform. It is no
coincidence that the Republican Party was suddenly interested in finding a solution to Latino illegal
immigrants right after they failed to attract the Latino vote in the 2012 presidential election. See Pramila
Jayapal, Why Don’t Republicans Want to Win?, POLITICO (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.politico.com/
story/2013/08/why-dont-republicans-want-to-win-95247.html.
324. As Friedman states, “in an age of cohabitation, there is no place in the legal order for the
concept of bastardy.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 255, at 127.
325. The U.S. Supreme Court made this direct relationship clear when it struck down the
difference between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72
(1968) (“The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own
mother. When the child’s claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of “equal
protection,” should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? . . . Legitimacy or
illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These
children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were
indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that
any dependent would.”).
326. This has been the approach of several courts in the United States. In order to determine if a
relationship meets the required standards for one of the parties to make a claim of emotional harm when
the other party has been injured, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that a court should “take
into account the duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common
contribution to a life together . . . and the manner in which they related to each other in attending to
life’s mundane requirements.” Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H. 2003). The Graves court also

22_SAEZ_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/15/2015 3:18 PM

TRANSFORMING FAMILY LAW

179

In 1990, Colombia created a legal regime for unmarried heterosexual
couples.327 This recognition was the basis upon which LGBT activists in
Colombia sought recognition of same-sex couples. In a line of decisions,
the Constitutional Court of Colombia granted same-sex couples the same
rights originally established by law for heterosexual de facto marital
unions. The Court also expanded the rights associated with de facto
unions, further reducing the difference between married and unmarried
couples.328 In each decision, the Court adopted a functionalist approach to
families by comparing what married and unmarried couples do, and
concluding that if these couples fulfill similar objectives and behave
similarly, statutes granting specific benefits should not distinguish between
these families.329 This approach is derived from the Court’s strong
protection of autonomy:
It is thus clear that the current legal system, founded on respect for
human dignity, tolerance, solidarity and personal autonomy does
not allow the State to create legal tools to stigmatize some sexual
behaviors and, to a certain extent, hinder the free exercise of
sexuality. Such conduct would not only annul the right to the free
development of personality and intimacy, but also the pluralism that
our own constitutional system accepts and mandates to protect.330

Although the regulation of cohabitation outside marriage has emerged
out of demands for fairness, the increase in the number of regulations that
recognize unmarried couples as family associations has also had an impact
on the perception of marriage as the normative ideal. States or countries

cites cases in Hawaii, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia to support its
position. Id.
327. In 1990, the Colombian Congress passed Law 54. Article 1 of the law defines the “marital de
facto union” as one “formed by one man and one woman who, without being married, have an
exclusive and permanent life-partnership.” L. 54/90, diciembre 28, 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Colom.).
328. Colombia has gone as far as recognizing pension benefits for the cohabitant of a deceased,
even when there is a legal spouse as well. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre
22, 2008, Sentencia C-1035/08 (Colom.). The Court recognized pension benefits for cohabitants and
pension-sharing when the deceased cohabited with a legal spouse. Following the tradition of the
Napoleonic Code, the Colombian Civil Code includes the legal spouse of the deceased as mandatory
intestate heir. CODIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] [C.C.] art. 1040 (Colom.). In 2012, however, the
Constitutional Court stated that the statute was conditionally constitutional “as long as it is understood
that it encompasses the permanent partner of different or same sex who formed with the deceased, to
whom [he or she] survives, a de facto union.” Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo
22, 2012, Sentencia C-238/12 (Colom.); see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
abril 13, 2011, Sentencia C-283/11 (Colom.).
329. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, Gaceta
Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).
330. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 14, 1999, Sentencia C-507/99, ¶ 5.3
(Colom.).
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that have afforded same-sex couples some formal recognition and rights
also tend to accept same-sex marriage in later decisions as a logical next
step.331 Keeping marriage as the paradigm of family formation is
increasingly less justifiable. It is also increasingly unfair.
Two examples illustrate the unfairness of constructing the legal family
around marriage, to the detriment of the recognition of unmarried families.
1. The husband as the father and the father as a stranger.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted
with the task of determining if the relationship between a daughter and her
biological father was worth the protection of the law or if, on the contrary,
legal marriage outweighed biology to the point of denying the daughter’s
biological father paternity in favor of the mother’s legal husband.332 The
Court chose the latter.333 Michael had an affair with Carole while she was
married to Gerald.334 From this affair, Victoria was born.335 Gerald and
Carole separated and Michael and Carole lived together for a few
months.336 Michael developed a relationship with Victoria during this
time.337 When Gerald and Carole reunited, Michael filed a filiation action
to establish paternity and visitation rights.338 The Superior Court granted
Gerald’s summary judgment motion because under California law, he was
presumed to be Victoria’s father, and because he was living with Victoria’s
mother at the time Victoria was born. Michael and Victoria appealed, but
the California Court of Appeals affirmed.339 Under California law, a child
born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent
nor sterile, was presumed to be a child of the marriage. This presumption
could be rebutted in limited circumstances by the husband or wife only.340
The Supreme Court had to determine if the statute violated the biological
father’s procedural and substantive due process rights, and the child’s equal
protection and due process rights.341

331. All of the countries and states reviewed in this Article have provided some formal recognition
to unmarried same-sex couples before granting same-sex marriage.
332. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
333. Id. at 130–31.
334. Id. at 113.
335. Id. at 114.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 113–14.
338. Id. at 114.
339. Id. at 116.
340. Id. at 113 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 2014) (repealed 1992)). CAL. FAM. CODE §
7611 (West 2014), has replaced that provision with a similar regulation.
341. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113, 116.

22_SAEZ_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

TRANSFORMING FAMILY LAW

4/15/2015 3:18 PM

181

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, quickly dismissed any
possibility of allowing dual fatherhood. “At the outset,” Justice Scalia
stated, “it is necessary to clarify what he [Michael] sought and what he was
denied. California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.”342 After that, it was clear that only one of the two men
seeking recognition of his paternity could win. Michael had biology on his
side and Gerald had marriage. Both had bonded with the child. Justice
Scalia considered the statute constitutional because California has an
interest in family stability.343 He quoted the court of appeals’ decision
stating, “[t]he conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law
based upon a determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding
social policy, that given a certain relationship between the husband and
wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and that the
integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.”344
According to this interpretation, a natural father and his daughter are
not a family if marriage interferes. That link cannot be destroyed because
it doesn’t exist legally. There is, however, a family between Carole and
Gerald that must not be disturbed. The Court refused to find a liberty
interest in Michael’s relationship with Victoria because Michael’s interest
was not “traditionally protected by our society.”345 Justice Scalia’s opinion
reinforced the communion between the legal and marital family, and the
divide between legal and socially constructed families. In the eyes of the
majority, the relationship between Michael and Victoria had not been
historically treated as a protected unit or granted a special protection. 346
On the contrary, the marital unit has been historically awarded a special
protection against claims such as Michael’s.347 The U.S. Supreme Court
did not see the possibility of accepting familial ties that simultaneously
recognize the actual relationship between Victoria and Gerald, and a
separate but equally valid relationship between Victoria and her natural
father, Michael.

342. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
343. See id. at 131 (“When the husband or wife contests the legitimacy of their child, the stability
of the marriage has already been shaken. In contrast, allowing a claim of illegitimacy to be pressed by
the child—or, more accurately, by a court-appointed guardian ad litem—may well disrupt an otherwise
peaceful union.”).
344. Id. at 119–20.
345. Id. at 122.
346. See id. at 124 (stating it is “impossible” to find that Michael and Victoria’s “situation” has
been historically treated as a protected family unit, and that it had not “been accorded special
protection” on any other basis).
347. See id. at 125 (“[T]he evidence shows that even in modern times . . . the ability of a person in
Michael’s position to claim paternity has not been generally acknowledged.”).
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2. The estranged wife as the family and the long-term companion as
a stranger
Eliana Perez Carreño and Manuel Alvarez Jimenez married in Chile in
1950 and separated before 1962.348 Gladys Grez Jahnsen started a
relationship with Manuel Alvarez Jimenez in 1962 and they lived together
until 1988, when Manuel died.349 During their life together, Gladys and
Manuel acquired real estate.350 According to the Chilean Civil Code, the
wife and children of the deceased are his legal heirs.351 The unmarried
partner is not.352 Gladys requested that the Court recognize a shared
property interest between herself and Manuel over assets that they had
acquired together.353 The lower court granted Gladys’ request and
recognized fifty percent of Manuel’s estate as hers.354 The court of appeals
affirmed.355 The Supreme Court of Chile reversed, holding that the lower
courts erred by dismissing the Civil Code’s estate rules.356 Gladys lived
with Manuel for thirty-four years but her relationship was completely
invisible to the court. No mutual support, no shared effort counted during
this time. Manuel’s relationship with his legal wife was the only
relationship that the Court was willing to see.
Although these examples may be met by different responses from
today’s courts, they illustrate the shortsightedness of the married family
protection. There are millions of stories like this around the world: women
and men who have raised the children of their partners but do not count as
families at the moment of their partners’ death; same-sex couples who are
not protected under domestic violence statutes because they are not
considered family;357 gay men and lesbian women who cannot adopt their
348. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2005, “Grez Jahnsen Gladys
del Carmen c. Alvarez Pérez Manuel Miguel y otros” Rol de la causa: 5508-1998, REVISTA DE
DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA [R.D.J.] No. 2, p.233–44 (Chile), available at http://www.scielo.cl/
scielo.php?pid=S071809502005000200012&script=sci_arttext. The decision is divided in two parts,
following the Chilean system of structuring legal decisions. Part I is titled “Vistos,” and describes the
hearing and decision being challenged. In this case, the appellants challenged the decision of the
Thirteenth Civil Court of Santiago declaring that assets between Gladys Grez Jahnsen and Manuel
Alvarez Jimenez were communal. Part II provides the Court’s reasoning and decision reversing the
lower court.
349. Id. at Part I, ¶ 2.
350. Id.
351. Id. at Part II, ¶ 5.
352. Id.
353. Id. at Part I, ¶ 2.
354. Id. at Part I, ¶ 5.
355. Id. at Part I, ¶ 6.
356. Id. at Part II, ¶ 11.
357. See Pueblo v. Ruiz, 159 D.P.R. 194, 202 (P.R. 2003) (“[E]l propósito cardinal de la política
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partners’ children because of their sexual orientation;358 adults raising the
children of friends or former partners who died or are too ill to care for
those children.
Undeniably, same-sex marriage benefits many families. Along the
path toward recognition, it is important not to close the door for the
recognition of other types of associations that are even more invisible to the
law. Many people do not get married or marry after periods of
cohabitation.359 This is not always because they are of the same sex, but
because their lives are too complex, and their most stable support networks
are not tied to emotional relationships based on sexual attraction and
romantic love. These relationships are built on extended support by
traditional kinship, such as grandparents, aunts, cousins, or other groups of
people such as community members, godparents, and friends. The question
of what families do, and whether we will recognize them without making
them take their case to court (where they will most likely lose), is more
important than who should be treated as family ex ante. People rely on
different family members for different issues. Family law needs to
acknowledge and understand a complex web of relationships. It is not the
aim of this Article to elaborate on how exactly to recognize functional
families. However, any reflections on what families are and how family
law should protect them requires acknowledging the flaws of a marriagecentric system.

pública enunciada es fortalecer la institución de la familia, que se visualiza como una política que surge
y se ampara en la unión sentimental y legal entre un hombre y una mujer.” [“[T]he main purpose of the
public policy [advanced in the domestic violence statute] is to strengthen the institution of the family,
which is seen as one that emerges from and is protected by the emotional and legal union between a
man and a woman.”]).
358. See X and Others v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) (finding Austria in
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights for not allowing second parent adoption for
same-sex couples while allowing it for unmarried heterosexual couples). The same court, however, did
not find it discriminatory that a same-sex couple could not access second parent adoption because
heterosexual unmarried couples did not have access to it as well. Gas and Dubois v. France, App. No.
25951/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (“[M]arriage confers a special status on those who enter into it. The
exercise of the right to marry is protected by Article 12 of the Convention and gives rise to social,
personal and legal consequences.”).
359. For the United States, see CASEY E. COPEN ET AL, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006–2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY
GROWTH 2 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf. In Europe, there are
striking variations between Northern European countries where cohabitation is very prominent and
Southern European countries where it is less prevalent. Throughout Europe, however, there is an
increase in cohabitation patterns. See Kathleen Kiernan, Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, 66 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 980, 985 (2004). For a rise in cohabitation trends in Latin America, see generally
Albert Esteve, Ron Lesthaeghe & Antonio Lopez-Gay, The Latin American Cohabitation Boom, 1970
2007, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 55 (2012).
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III. THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DECISION-MAKING
In prior sections, this Article focused on the role of marriage and
family law, and whether court decisions on same-sex marriage have
reinforced or reduced the importance of marriage as the gateway to family
formation. It is clear that the same arguments are being used to reinforce
marriage, to accept same-sex marriage, or to broaden the scope of family
protection through constitutional norms. A comparative analysis of national
court decisions on same-sex marriage also shows that courts read each
other’s work.
There is abundant literature to accept as a fact that courts often use
arguments articulated in other proceedings to develop their own legal
reasoning.360 Even U.S. courts, though more cautious than courts from
other countries in using foreign law, have referred in several decisions to
foreign rulings.361 The means by which courts use foreign decisions varies
greatly. Ann-Marie Slaughter refers to vertical and horizontal judicial
globalization.362 When national courts use arguments and decisions by
supranational courts, those courts are engaging in a vertical type of judicial
borrowing, even when they are not bound by these judgments. When
courts look at what other countries are doing, they engage in a “crossfertilization” of judicial decisions.363 It seems that areas where there is
insufficient precedent, or areas that can be perceived by society as radical
shifts in a legal system, are good places to use foreign legal decisions as
supporting resources.364 Technology has also made it easier for judges to
contemplate foreign solutions to the same issues. As Australian Justice
Michael Kirby explains, “[h]onesty and transparency sometimes suggest an

360. For an account on how judges use foreign law, see, e.g., David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang,
The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011). For an analysis on legal
transplants in the context of adjudication processes in Canada, see, e.g., Michel Bastarache, How
Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U.N.B. L.J. 190 (2009). For Europe,
see, e.g., Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, The Judge As Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005).
For Latin America, see, e.g., Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129 (2008).
361. For an analysis of the use of foreign legal decisions by American courts, see generally David
S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie
Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and
the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005).
362. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112 (2000)
363. Id.
364. See Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 4 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) (“[F]oreign judgments are
a source of practical wisdom to the tough business of deciding hard cases where the positive legal
materials run out.”).
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acknowledgement of such source materials.”365
In the area of same-sex marriage, the use of foreign law is evident.
The courts of South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Colombia, and Spain
explicitly referred to foreign and international court judgments in their
decisions, as well as foreign legislation and legal scholarship. They used
these sources in two different ways. Sometimes, foreign sources were used
to reinforce a particular argument advanced by the court.366 In other cases,
foreign decisions were cited along with information on foreign legislation
that includes same-sex marriage, and international law materials in favor of
advancing gay and lesbian rights in general.367 With regards to how these
arguments reach courts, in some cases decisions refer to arguments from
foreign sources because the parties or third party interveners brought those
sources to the court’s attention.368 Due to the different styles of writing
decisions, however, it is not always possible to identify if foreign
arguments are part of the parties’ litigation strategy, or if they were adopted
by the court’s own initiative. The use of international law varies depending
on each country’s legal mandate to use international law. All of the foreign
decisions analyzed here refer to international instruments, especially those
from Europe. In some cases, however, courts used international decisions
for their argumentative power, rather than as authoritative sources of law.
A. Good arguments are good arguments everywhere
Most literature on “judicial borrowing” analyzes the use of foreign

365. Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and Australian
Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2008).
366. See, e.g. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (quoting Brown
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to highlight the need for the legislature to seek a
solution for same-sex couples that would include tangible and intangible benefits). In the case of
Portugal, opponents to same-sex marriage argued that international law supported the position that
marriage was protected as a union between a man and a woman. See S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82,
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 (Port.) (citing several decisions, and quoting,
among others, the South African decision in Fourie to highlight that international law may protect the
heterosexual marriage but it does not forbid expanding such protection); Primera Sala de la Suprema
Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época,
5 de Diciembre de 2012, 41, 48–49 (Mex.) (citing Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Brown, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to compare discrimination based on
sexual orientation with racial discrimination).
367. See Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶ 267 (Mex.); S.T.C.,
Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 14 (Port.); S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p.168, 193–94) (Spain).
368. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11,
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). Additionally, all parties to the proceedings referred to foreign
law to illustrate their own arguments. Id. at 17, 22–23; Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 99; SCJN, Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 42.
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legal sources by local courts from the perspective of their argumentative
force.369 There is little disagreement about the lack of authoritative force of
foreign sources.370 The substantive justifications given by others are what
make a foreign case compelling or not. It is the weight of the argument,
not the weight of the court that made the argument that matters.
Sometimes, a good argument made by a prestigious court makes a given
argument even more compelling. There is no way, however, to know what
makes one court more prestigious than others to the court borrowing one of
their arguments. Courts also refer to international decisions regardless of
whether they are bound by them. Non-binding international and foreign
decisions are used by courts to find compelling arguments.
The Colombia Constitutional Court explains the role of foreign
decisions and foreign scholarship as additional argumentative sources,
stating that “[f]oreign scholarship, before national scholarship, has dealt at
length with this issue [of same-sex marriage].”371 The Court goes on to add
that, “constitutional courts and tribunals of other latitudes have dealt with
similar petitions, as the broad reference to comparative law by Action D8376 shows.”372 The Portuguese Constitutional Court gave a similar
explanation for its use of comparative law. The Court rejected the idea that
the regulation of same-sex relationships was limited to a local discussion.
On the contrary, it stated that when there are issues linked to “human
problems as universal as those related to the legal protection of homosexual
relations it may be interesting to know what happened in other legal
experiences.”373 The Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal referred to the
need to maintain its autonomy when deciding these issues, but stated that
the use of comparative law could help it draw legal principles common to
all of those legal experiences.374 With the exception of the American and
Canadian decisions, the decisions on same-sex marriage presented here
used both foreign and international decisions and scholarship to bolster
their own ideas on the issue.
The South African Constitution expressly allows judges to consider
foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.375 In Fourie, the South
African Constitutional Court cited Canadian case law to emphasize the idea
that not all differentiations are discriminatory, and special measures are
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Choudhry, supra note 364, at 3.
Id.
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11, ¶ 2.2.
Id.
S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 7 (Port.).
Id.
S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(c).
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sometimes necessary.376 For its justification on why same-sex marriage did
not interfere with freedom of religion, the Court again cited Canadian
sources as well as American decisions.377 The Constitution of South Africa
also provides that courts “must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”378 Consistent
with the constitutional mandate, the Fourie decision included a section on
international law.379 The Minister of Home Affairs argued that international
law did not recognize a right to same-sex marriage.380 The Supreme Court
of South Africa responded to the international case law against same-sex
marriage by stating that “while it is true that international law expressly
protects heterosexual marriage,” international law did not exclude the
possibility of same-sex marriage.381 The South African Court showed
deference to international law arguments brought to its consideration but
rejected them on substantive grounds.382
The Spanish Constitutional Court used comparative law in several
parts of its 2012 decision on same-sex marriage. For example, to support
its statement that institutions evolve, the Spanish Constitutional Court cited
the Canadian Supreme Court’s concept of the constitution as a “living
tree,” and explained that the evolving nature of Spain’s Constitution is
precisely the reason why the Court must reject marriage as essentially
heterosexual.383 The Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal also referred at
length to foreign courts.384
As the South African case shows, many of the foreign decisions used
376. Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 152 (citing Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R 872, 874 (Can.)).
377. Id. ¶ 9 (citing Canadian Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, Freedom of Religion and the Rule
of Law: A Canadian Perspective, in RECOGNISING RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2000)).
378. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 233.
379. Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 99–105.
380. Id. ¶ 99.
381. Id. ¶ 100 (citing Joslin v. New Zealand, U.N. H.R.C. Communication No. 902/1999, U.N.
Doc A/57/40 (July 17, 2002)).
382. In Fourie, the Counsel for the Minister of Justice argued that International Law protected
marriage as a heterosexual institution. Id. ¶¶ 46, 100. The Court argued that the intention of
international law was to “forbid child marriages, remove racial, religious or nationality impediments to
marriage, ensure that marriage is freely entered into and guarantee equal rights before, during and after
marriage.” Id. ¶ 100. The Court added that “[t]here is nothing in the international law instruments to
suggest that the family which is the fundamental unit of society must be constituted according to any
particular mode.” Id. ¶ 101.
383. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 180) (Spain).
384. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367
¶ 12–15 (Port.).
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by other courts for their argumentative force did not deal with same-sex
marriage. South Africa and Mexico, for example, used three American
landmark cases to support same-sex marriage on the basis of equality, not
marriage: Brown v. Board of Education, the dissenting opinion from Plessy
v. Ferguson, and Loving v. Virginia.385 These courts could have decided to
use compelling arguments on the importance of marriage. If they were
going to cite American jurisprudence, they had plenty to choose from
opinions expounding on marriage as an essentially “good” institution.
However, they decided to emphasize the discrimination inherent in a twotiered system of same-sex civil unions and opposite-sex marriage.386
Brown, Plessy, and Loving are decisions that speak about equality not
marriage, but their reasoning is appealing beyond any specific national
constitution.
The Brazilian STF’s 2011 decision also did not refer to specific
arguments used by foreign courts. No other decision, however, reads more
like a text on jurisprudence than the combined opinions of the Brazilian
decision. Even though it is not possible to point to a specific “migration of
constitutional ideas,”387 the decision referred to legal philosophy through
the writings of American, European, and Latin American scholars.388 It
used a universal narrative on the rule of law, the role of courts, and the
concepts of equality and autonomy.
By contrast, in its first decision on same-sex marriage, Mexico’s
Supreme Court barely mentioned the Inter-American System of Human
Rights.389 It did, however, cite the European Court of Human Rights

385. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka 347 U.S. 483,
486 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
386. Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012, 41, 48 (Mex.); Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 150,
154.
387. Choudhry, supra note 364, at 2.
388. For example, Luiz Fux cites foreign scholars such as Robert Alexy, Ernst Benda, and Nancy
Fraser. He also cites Ronald Dworkin’s explanation of American constitutional law and considers the
application of Dworkin’s writings to Brazilian constitutional law as well. Fux also cites Spanish
scholars discussing the same-sex marriage legislation in Spain. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min.
Luiz Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659
(Braz.). Justice Ayres Britto cites, among others, Max Scheler, John Rawls, Hans Kelsen, Nietzche,
Hegel, and Sartre. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO
SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 9, 12, 14, 17 (Braz.). Justice Marco
Aurelio refers to the opposing positions of H.L.A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin with regard to the
decriminalization of sodomy laws. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011,
198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 5 (Braz.).
389. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶ 313 (Mex.).
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(ECHR) and its case law on sexual orientation discrimination.390 Unlike
the ECHR, by the beginning of 2014, the Inter-American System of Human
Rights had decided only one case that involved discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, and it was not a case on marriage.391 In Atala Riffo
and daughters v. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made
sexual orientation a protected category, and declared that the concept of
family protected by the American Convention of Human Rights was not
tied to marriage or to heterosexuality.392 The Atala decision had not yet
been issued when Mexico’s Supreme Court issued its first decision on
same-sex marriage. The SCJN, however, used Atala to support its second
decision on same-sex marriage, affirming that a separate but equal
treatment of same-sex couples was unconstitutional.393 This second
decision extensively cited foreign courts to support its arguments in favor
of marriage equality.394 It also cited U.S. decisions to explain its levels of
scrutiny.395 When describing the requirements for its own system of strict
scrutiny, the SCJN reinforced its explanation by referring to the same
concept used by the U.S. Supreme Court for each element of the test.396
Brazil also referred to the Inter-American System of Human Rights, citing
decisions that were not directly related to same-sex couples, but that spoke
about the right to the protection of a person’s life project.397
B. Foreign sources as descriptive tendencies
Colombia used comparative law at length to illustrate the state of
same-sex couples’ recognition around the world.398 The plaintiffs
challenging the constitutionality of heterosexual marriage in the CCC
included a thorough comparative law analysis to support their case.399 The
court, however, “replied” to those comparative law arguments by giving a
390. Id. ¶ 248.
391. Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012).
392. Id. at 35, 50.
393. Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012, 50 (Mex.).
394. See, e.g., id. at 25 fn. 9.
395. Id. at 34–36.
396. Id.
397. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 14 (Braz.) (referring to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights cases Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, and Gutierrez Soler v.
Colombia).
398. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, Gaceta
Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).
399. Id. at 171.
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full account of same-sex regulations around the world.400 Although the
court focused on some arguments provided by foreign courts, it mostly
focused on demonstrating that there was not one specific trend towards
same-sex marriage as an equality imperative.401
The Constitutional Courts of Portugal and Spain, as well as the
Supreme Court of Mexico, also made references to comparative law.402 In
all of these cases, references to both legislation and court decisions were
used to support the Court’s own decisions. The Courts did not employ,
however, a particular foreign argument in their decisions. Instead, they
displayed the complete map of what was happening in other countries, in
order to situate their own court within a worldwide trend. They could
demonstrate to their own community that they were not outliers, but rather
part of an almost inevitable global shift. The Constitutional Tribunal of
Portugal referred to comparative and international law to support its
statement that the realm of family and marriage was changing at a fast pace
globally, and not just in Portugal.403
As mentioned before, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal used foreign
scholarship to support its own arguments. It also used references to foreign
regulations as a measure of an evolving reality in the area of same-sex
couples.404 With this intent, the decision cited regulations of the European
Union to support its own decision to recognize same-sex couples as
permanent unions.405 The decision not only referred to binding European
law instruments, but also to foreign sources related to discrimination.
Justice Marco Aurelio’s opinion, for example, referenced the Wolfenden
Report issued in Great Britain in 1957.406
400. Id. at 171–74.
401. Id. at 171.
402. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 180, 193) (Spain); S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010,
82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 ¶ 12–15 (Port.); Primera Sala de la
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 152/2013,
Décima Época, 23 de Abril de 2014, slip op. 1, 26–27, 41, 48 (Mex.).
403. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, at 22370 (citing the European Human Rights Convention,
supra note 250); id. at 22372–74 (referring to different European countries).
404. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 20 (Braz.) (citing the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS (1776)).
405. Id. at 16.
406. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 4 (Braz.) (discussing the Wolfenden Report, a
report issued by a Parliamentary Committee in the United Kingdom recommending a drastic withdrawal
of government involvement in homosexuality and prostitution, recommending the decriminalization of
sodomy and prostitution, and generating an influential debate on the relationship between law and
morality); see generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
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The level of influence of foreign and international decisions in
national courts’ decisions is indeterminate. It is clear, however, that judges
are reading each other’s opinions. Perhaps those readings were compelling
enough to convince them to consider their own constitutional frameworks
as “living trees,” or to bring their own constitutional interpretations of
dignity closer to autonomy and equality.
IV. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
A. Reinforcing the marriage paradigm: the conformist approach
Same-sex marriage can be viewed as the most important departure of
legal marriage from its basic source, the Judeo-Christian marriage. This
seems to reflect a new construction of the community ethos, based on the
supremacy of individual autonomy rather than on restrictions of individual
liberties for a supposedly collective benefit. But as revolutionary as this
claim may seem, we can also argue that this is the alternative that best suits
the status quo.407 Same-sex marriage does not challenge marriage as an
institution and it does not challenge state intervention in intimacy. Samesex marriage leaves all elements and effects of the traditional institution
intact. It does not affect the claims of non-married heterosexual couples or
the claims of individuals who have created their families around nontraditional structures, such as sisters living together, or single friends who
age together.408 The inclusion of same-sex couples into the marriage
institution does not represent a real change of paradigm in family law. It is,
on the contrary, a sort of “escape valve” that maintains marriage’s status as
the gatekeeper of the legal family.
Countries that value marriage as a societal aspiration, and value
autonomy and equality as core public values have two options. They can tip
the scale towards marriage and maintain a caste-like system of families in
which marital families receive more protection than non-marital ones. Or,
they can shift the focus from marriage to functions of dependency and
support. In the latter, family and citizenship are liberated from their
dependency on marriage. In this scenario, family is tied to citizenship by
assuming the role of forming individuals that understand values of equality,
respect for diversity, and democracy. Instead, countries that decide to
reinforce marriage as the family law paradigm are also reinforcing a
traditional link between marriage and citizenship. By doing so, they are

407. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 185
(1995) (“Gay marriage is not a radical step; it is a profoundly humanizing, traditionalizing step.”).
408. POLIKOFF, supra note 13.
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creating two types of citizens: the good citizen, and the “not so good”
citizen. The good citizen gets married and by that act, simplifies the
entrance to citizenship for her immediate family members. The good
citizen gets benefits and her family is legally recognized as such. The “not
so good” citizen, instead, does not behave in the way she should. What she
may call a family is not recognized as such. Her citizenship is not good
enough to provide citizenship to her immediate family members, and her
contributions as a citizen are not good enough to take advantage of the
rights and benefits granted to good citizens.
In cases where marriage has been made available to same-sex couples
based on the inherent value of marriage, the decisions show that same-sex
couples are worthy of the institution of marriage.409 In order to achieve
access, assimilation of the different group to the majoritarian group is
necessary. Images of loving same-sex couples that are stable, caring,
educated and engaged in their communities cover the pages of magazines,
newspapers, court decisions, and congressional debates.410 Marriage is
open to heterosexual couples no matter how badly they behave. Same-sex
couples, however, must show that the group is worthy of marriage as an
aspiration. They are good citizens that need to become better ones by
accessing marriage.
The conformist approach to same-sex marriage closes the chapter on
same-sex marriage. It also closes, or at least makes more difficult, the
debate on family protection and the role of family law. After Goodridge,
Windsor, and each new statute allowing same-sex marriage there is—
rightly so—a celebration by same-sex marriage advocates. There is no
celebration, however, for aunts, neighbors, and friends taking care of
distant or unrelated children or dependent adults. There is no celebration
for heterosexual or same-sex unmarried couples who do not wish to or
cannot marry for reasons unrelated to its recognition by a legal system, but
who nonetheless act as and consider themselves a family. The division
between married families and unmarried families continues. As long as
family law acts as a filter through which only some unions become visible
to the law, decisions that reinforce marriage as the most important bond
will keep depriving individuals of possible legal protections for their family
ties.
Whether the United States maintains and reinforces the marriage
paradigm will depend on the grounds that state courts may use to decide

409. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
410. Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife.
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same-sex marriage cases after Windsor. There are already several courts
that used Windsor as part of their reasoning to allow same-sex marriage.411
Not all state courts have taken a conformist approach to marriage or have
picked up on the institutional concept of dignity used by the U.S. Supreme
Court. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court referred several times
to Windsor in its 2014 decision on same-sex marriage.412 It used dignity as
a justification for opening marriage to same-sex couples, but mainly used
arguments based on equality. The court referred to the substantive benefits
granted to married couples that unmarried same-sex couples do not have.413
This decision is a cause for optimism.
B. Real families as legal families: the transformational power of the
same-sex marriage debate
By embracing a flexible approach to families, we recognize in all
human beings the equality of worth enshrined in the South African
Constitution. We not only embrace the dignity that comes from choosing
one’s family unit, but more importantly, we recognize that all family
associations that respect constitutional values and human rights are worth
the same respect. Most people do not have the luxury of choosing their
families, and with the exception of a small percentage of women, single
mothers are not single mothers by choice. Dignity, therefore, must cover
not only autonomy, but also equality of worth.
Triggered by the debate on same-sex marriage, the discussion on
family diversity has the power to align the “real” families with the legally
recognized ones. Some decisions have given us an opportunity to start
using the law to protect and foster the best possible environment for family
stability, instead of clinging to the historical myopic obsession with
marriage.
The combination of several fundamental rights, such as autonomy and
411. In the year after Windsor, around sixteen decisions on same-sex marriage were issued, all
referring to Windsor. See, e.g., Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 877 (N.M. 2013); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(D. Utah 2013); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Bishop v. United
States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014). Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (W.D.
Ky. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp.
2d 632, 648 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); DeBoer v.
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio
2014); Kendall Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60-CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998004 (Ark. Cir. May 15, 2014);
Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014); Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Utah
2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F.
Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (D. Or. 2014).
412. Griego, 316 P.3d at 876.
413. Id. at 887–88.
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equality, with a conception of human dignity, provides us with the grounds
to make family law a set of rules aimed at protecting families as they
evolve, rather than a set of rules that artificially construct a legal family to
which families must conform. It is impossible to maintain a political
system that treats privacy, freedom of association, and equality as
fundamental individual rights, but that simultaneously restricts marriage to
heterosexual couples or, more importantly, restricts family protection to the
married family.
Discourses on dignity usually relate to different dimensions of
humanity. The South African Constitutional Court speaks of dignity as
equality, though it has sometimes used dignity as autonomy or liberty.414
The emphasis, however, is particularly set in equality of worth that derives
from our condition as human beings. Mexico’s Supreme Court embraces
an idea of dignity linked to autonomy.415 It also refers to dignity as
equality, but the emphasis in the case of marriage is on the right to freely
choose family associations without a state-imposed ideal of the family.416
These fundamental rights have been at the core of legislative acts and
adjudication processes striking down sodomy statutes. The next logical
step, if courts are consistent in their interpretation, requires the rejection of
majoritarian efforts to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples and the
opening up of marriage to same-sex couples. Consistency, however,
requires more than just allowing same-sex marriage. It requires a revision
of the reasons for protecting one institution over others. This has been the
approach of some of the courts reviewed here. 417 These courts have at
least recognized that families today are formed from different sources.
They have applied equality and autonomy to conclude that non-married
couples should enjoy the same status as married couples when it comes to
legal benefits and obligations. They have all recognized the evolving nature
of the family and the need, for the sake of equality, to protect families
414. See, e.g., Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524, 29 (CC) (S. Afr.); but see id.
at 10.
415. Rogelio López Sánchez, El Tardío Desarrollo de la Dignidad Humana y el Libre Desarrollo
de la personalidad en el Estado Constitucional Mexicano, REVISTA DERECHO EN LIBERTAD NO. 3,
146–47 (2009), available at http://fldm.edu.mx/revista.
416. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. 1, 98 (Mex.).
417. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367
(Port.). In the Brazilian case, Justice Ayres Britto stated that the Brazilian Constitution protected “the
family in its common or proverbial sense as a domestic unit, with little regard as if it was formally or
informally created, or if its formed by heterosexual couples or individuals openly gay [homoaffetivas].
Consequently, the family is a cultural and spiritual fact at the same time (although not necessarily a
biological fact).” S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 28 (Braz.).
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regardless of how they are formed. Which families get to be legally
recognized does not depend on the nature of the bond, but on how those
associations respect the same values and rights of each individual family
member. Family units that do not respect equality between men and
women, or children’s rights, do not have to be afforded the protection of
the law.
Decisions that have the potential to transform family law may one day
desexualize families. It is unrealistic to divide families according to the
sexual orientation of their members. What should matter is not the sex of
the two individuals that make up a family unit, but the role each person
fulfills within the family. What Martha Fineman and Nancy Polikoff have
argued for so many years now has practical equivalents in court decisions
from countries with diverse cultural and legal backgrounds.418 There is
more in common between South Africa or Canada and the United States
than between Mexico and South Africa. These countries, however, have
chosen to see what reality has been showing us all along: families come in
all forms and shapes. As long as these familial associations respect the
rights of their members, legal systems should not prefer one type of
association to another. Some international courts are also taking a
transformational approach by including diverse families within the scope of
human rights. In Atala, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
interpreted the right to family in Article 17 of the American Convention on
Human Rights as encompassing different types of families:
The Court confirms that the American Convention does not define a
limited concept of family, nor does it only protect a “traditional”
model of the family. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the
concept of family life is not limited only to marriage and must
encompass other de facto family ties in which the parties live
together outside of marriage.419

Through human rights and constitutional rights, countries in the
Western world have created the framework to give all real families legal
recognition. Windsor gave the U.S. Supreme Court a new chance to define
its stance on the role of marriage and its relationship to family protection.
418. See generally, FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 13; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2005); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (1999);
Martha Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031
(2001); POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE
LAW, supra note 13; Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, supra note 13.
419. Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, 47–48 (Feb. 24, 2012).
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The Court in Windsor chose to speak about marriage rather than families.
It chose to speak about institutional dignity instead of human dignity as
equality and autonomy. Fortunately, it did not completely abandon the idea
of human dignity as liberty. Future litigators and judges have the task of
reinforcing that Kantian concept of dignity in U.S. courts, and following in
the footsteps of South Africa, Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil by reclaiming
the secular and liberal conception of dignity used in Lawrence.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that decisions from different countries
allowing same-sex marriage are not all equal. While some courts focus on
maintaining marriage as the paradigm of family formation, others center
their analysis on individual rights. A comparative analysis of these
decisions shows some promising trends for the future. First, there are more
decisions grounding their acceptance of same-sex marriage on equality and
autonomy than on marriage as an essentially good institution. Second, the
use of dignity as a constitutional value is more often attached to the rights
of equality and autonomy than to marriage as a status that provides dignity.
Third, we see more decisions referring to the need for legal systems to
adapt to social reality, which in turn will open a door to the legal
recognition of unmarried families on equal grounds as married ones.
Fourth, courts around the world are listening to each other, but not as a
matter of authority or out of a sense of camaraderie. Instead, courts refer to
each other’s arguments as a way of ensuring that the most compelling
arguments are being considered in their own decisions, and in order to
show that their own communities are not alone when it comes to discussing
new family associations. These narratives allow for a transformation of the
role of family law from a policing framework, which reinforces an
aspirational family based on marriage, to a protective framework for
socially constructed families.

